Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site psuvax1.UUCP
Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ukma!psuvm.bitnet!psuvax1!berman
From: berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman)
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Re: Strange Bedfellows: and a new to
Message-ID: <1922@psuvax1.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 13-Dec-85 12:06:58 EST
Article-I.D.: psuvax1.1922
Posted: Fri Dec 13 12:06:58 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 16-Dec-85 19:49:27 EST
References: <1272@ihuxn.UUCP> <28200380@inmet.UUCP>
Organization: Pennsylvania State Univ.
Lines: 81

>
> [Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,lll-crg,hplabs,intelca}!qantel!gabor]
> >In <28200323@inmet.UUCP> Jan Wasilewski writes:
> >> The following is Gabor's criticism of libertarians and  Marxists,
> >> respectively.
> >>
> >> >The democratic process will not do [for libertarians] as a  source
> >> >of  legitimacy for the state: this is the translation of the slo-
> >> >gan 'Taxation is Theft'.
> >>
> > The striking thing about the democratic process is its ability to create
> >new rights at an alarming rate. For example, the right of disabled children
> >to 'mainstream' education, the right of schizophrenics to be released from
> >mental hospitals and the rights flowing from affirmative action laws or the
> >Freedom of Information Act have all been codified within the last ten years
> >or so. It seems that the logic of the democratic process gravitates toward
> >inventing more rights rather than abolishing existing ones (whatever one may
> >think of the recent crop). So I cannot make sense of  your  ques-
> >tion  without some pointers to the implicit contradiction you are
> >hinting at.
>
> My fault entirely.
> Your point about democratic process creating rights is, I believe,
> central to the general discussion; I would like to store it and
> return to it. But it is peripheral to the particular question I raised.
> You will, I expect, agree that the democratic process can abrogate rights as
> well as create them. In some cases the abrogated rights can be
> quite fundamental. 3 examples will suffice: (1) military draft;
> (2) in post-WWII Britain several million people were attached to
> their jobs with no right to leave them; (3) "black codes" in
> post-Civil war South deprived blacks of freedom of movement and
> the right to own land.
>
> Someone who believes in "inalienable rights" must, I believe, set
> a boundary beyond which the democratic process cannot legitimate-
> ly go. Adherents of the "taxation  is  theft"  principle  believe
> that  here  is the boundary. Others do not go that far but assert
> that at least individual income tax as it exists in USA  violates
> fundamental  rights. It certainly abrogated *a* right; and it was
> at least fundamental enough to call for a  constitutional  amend-
> ment; and it was one of the few amendments restricting individual
> rights.
>
> If one believes in democratic process as the sole source of legi-
> timacy  for rights or right restriction, one has no logical prob-
> lem; if one believes *all* rights can be deduced from inalienable
> rights, ditto. But recognizing *two* sources of legitimacy raises
> the question of a demarcation line. In your response you seem  to
> hint  that  what  is  *necessary* ("adjunct and precondition") to
> public policy (and you think taxes are) should certainly fall  on
> the  side  of  alienable  rights.  *Now*  there apparently are
> *three* sources of legitimacy: will of the  people  (democratic
> process); practical necessity; and inalienable rights. All this
> is not unreasonable; and there may be no contradiction  here,  if
> the three spheres don't overlap. If they do, there is.
>
> My question is: how do *you* demarcate rights so that no
> contradiction arises ?
>
>               Jan Wasilewsky

An quote : "somebody's barbeque is somebody else's polution".
A right of somebody is a restriction of the rights of others.
Objectivists do not see any conflict.  Consider however the
following example: in Sweden there is a law that an owner of
a forest cannot prohibit the public to walk in his forest or
to pick berries and mushroom.  In essence, the ownership of
a forest is the right to grow and sell woods.  This limits
the rights of forest owners and enhances the rights of others.
Similarly, to create a "right" to education, protection,
defence etc., some rights concerning free disposition of the
income must be limited.  I think that there exists rights
which are inalienable (habeas corpus, free expression, fair
trial) and other rights, which although not inalienable, do
contribute to the quality of life, and as such are desirable.

I do not see the rights to invest, own means of production,
dispose freely with property etc. as inalienable, but rather
as desirable most of the time.

Piotr Berman