Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site umich.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ihnp4!mhuxn!mhuxr!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!mb2c!umich!torek From: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Re: Pollution: no libertarian soluti Message-ID: <379@umich.UUCP> Date: Fri, 20-Dec-85 13:57:01 EST Article-I.D.: umich.379 Posted: Fri Dec 20 13:57:01 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 23-Dec-85 05:45:17 EST References: <365@umich.UUCP> <28200403@inmet.UUCP> Reply-To: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) Organization: University of Michigan, EECS Dept., Ann Arbor, MI Lines: 37 In article <28200403@inmet.UUCP> nrh@inmet.UUCP writes: >I offer one hopefully interesting observation about questions such >as pollution and prisoner's dilemma problems. Both of these can, >in fact, be solved in principle (pollution by a nightmarishly complete >enumeration and enforcement of property rights by impartial judges, >and prisoners dilemma by stepping outside the "one-transaction-only" >scenario and allowing repeated and enforceable contractual relationships). The pollution "solution" wouldn't allow me to piss in the toilet. As for Prisoner's Dilemma, you're right about *2-person* PD, but things change when the number of persons increases. >In short, one can be a principled libertarian without knowing just >exactly how much use constitutes enough when claiming land, or just >how little constitutes giving it up. (Just as one can be for >the income tax without being able to quote the IRS manuals at length). Yes, as long as those "how much" questions are matters of *applying* your principles, not questions that must be addressed by the principles themselves. I'm awful curious how that could possibly be. >I believe that there's lots of middle ground between the idea of >libertarianism as a sort of social geometry -- invalid if any grey >areas or conflicts can be shown to exist, and libertarianism as a sort >of vague response to intuition. Well, maybe. But if the grey areas are greynesses of principles rather than empirical gray areas about how to apply them, I think you slide down the slippery slope to the "vague response to intuition" position. >Paul -- if you've posted (as planned) the reasoned basis for your own >value-weightings, I've missed the posting. Not yet; it's going to be a many-part series of enormous size, which I'll have time for soon, but not now. --Paul V. Torek, knee-jerk ethical cognitivist torek@umich