Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.16 $; site inmet.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!zeta!sabre!petrus!bellcore!decvax!genrad!panda!talcott!harvard!bbnccv!inmet!janw From: janw@inmet.UUCP Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Re: Pollution: no libertarian soluti Message-ID: <28200442@inmet.UUCP> Date: Wed, 25-Dec-85 20:41:00 EST Article-I.D.: inmet.28200442 Posted: Wed Dec 25 20:41:00 1985 Date-Received: Tue, 31-Dec-85 21:56:53 EST References: <374@umich.UUCP> Lines: 87 Nf-ID: #R:umich:-37400:inmet:28200442:000:4663 Nf-From: inmet!janw Dec 25 20:41:00 1985 [--Paul V. Torek (temporarily) flink@umcp-cs] >In article <28200417@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >>I must be missing something but why wouldn't the standard default >>libertarian solution for most things, namely litigation or the >>possibility of it - work for pollution ? >>I *can* see some objections but none that convinces me, so far. >>One thing that seems necessary is that compensation be allowed >>for *statistical risk* of damage, as well as actual damage. >>E.g., if A, by her smoking, gives B one chance of cancer in a >>million, and if B's health is worth 10 million, B should be >>able to collect 10 bucks immediately (forgoing, in all fairness, >>her right to sue for actual damage). Since statistical correla- >>tions are much easier to prove than who caused what to whom, this >>would tilt the balance against the polluters. >I can think of a few problems offhand. Good! This idea is new to me, and a critique would help. >First, a significant number of people sincerely feel that the value >of their lives is INFINITE. If you don't believe me, ask around. Oh, *I* agree - the *courts* don't, though (at least, I've never heard of an aleph-0 settlement ...). Neither do insurers or pol- lution regulators - they all use some kind of cost-benefit analysis, with human life attached (implicitly at least) a finite value. Its metaphysical or existential value is neither here nor there. The idea above does not change that at all - it just pro- rates an existing estimate to a statistical expectation. >Second, it's going to be hard to determine who is put at risk by >how much, and the likely solution will be to overestimate the >risk in most cases -- i.e. compensate most people by much larger >amounts than is really required, just to be on the safe side and >avoid hassles. This wouldn't be a total disaster, but it would >lead to quite severe restrictions on pollution, I think; such >that the cost of living goes up considerably. Wonderful! The proposal seems ready to be sponsored by Sierra Club. What you're saying is that it overshoots the mark. However the exis- ting regulatory and legal mechanisms are subject to the same emotio- nal pressures (human life vs. profits) - and, on the other hand, counter-pressures by industries. Is it obvious to you which comes nearer to hitting the mark, and by how much ? Mind you, I don't need to prove this one works *better*: just that it *works*. >Third, and worst, what about the ETHICAL problem for libertarians -- do I >have a right to impose ANY risks on anyone without their consent? It would >seem that the only principled libertarian answer is NO!, and that this >prohibits me from pissing in the toilet, because SOMEONE somewhere would be >unwilling to accept compensation only for *statistical risk*. You seem to attribute to all libertarians the unity of principle for the lack of which Bob Stubblefield recently criticised them. Probably the only way for you to convict libertarianism on an inconsistency charge is to concentrate on one person - someone you think is representative. If you succeed, others will either have to share the guilt or to show how they are different. As I see it, for most libertarians, your right to metabolize with your own body and on your own premises would be among the most indubitable. What you are really saying is that their principles are contradictory because every act of one person affects every other person in some infinitesimal way. That my right to wave my hands stops well short of your nose because all noses and all arms are, in some QM sense, of indeterminate length. Note that this argument applies equally well (or badly) to *any* concept of inalienable rights. There is nothing specifically anti- libertarian in it. All I can add is that *my* minarchist principles or anarchist preferences are not at all disturbed by your bathroom habits. Why should a libertarian ethic be more strict about your harming someone indirectly than a non-libertarian one ? The difference lies in restricting the *state* as well as individuals, not in restricting individuals *more*. It lies in refusal to let the state (even democratic state) identify itself with "all of us" or "public policy", or "general welfare", thus sanctioning what would be a crime in individuals. E.g., I *might* admit the neces- sity of government for *defense* - but never of a government *monopoly* on defense. And as competing systems develop, the necessity might disappear. The state is a *crutch*; it shouldn't be made a *fetish*. Jan Wasilewsky