Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!decvax!ucbvax!arms-d From: ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) Newsgroups: mod.politics.arms-d Subject: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #8.3 Message-ID: <8601052045.AA00419@ucbvax.berkeley.edu> Date: Sat, 4-Jan-86 23:08:00 EST Article-I.D.: ucbvax.8601052045.AA00419 Posted: Sat Jan 4 23:08:00 1986 Date-Received: Sun, 5-Jan-86 20:11:27 EST Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: ARMS-D%MIT-MC.ARPA@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU Organization: The ARPA Internet Lines: 186 Approved: arms-d@mit-mc.arpa Arms-Discussion Digest Saturday, January 4, 1986 11:08PM Volume 6, Issue 8.3 Today's Topics: see #8.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 4 Jan 86 14:32:45 pst From: Gary Chapman Subject: Beyond War I am willing to be critical of the organization Beyond War. Although on the whole I think the organization is benign, I also don't think it's constructive, either. War will never be eliminated from the human condition as a *potential* activity. That is, it will never be made simply unthinkable or impossible. I talk to the leaders of Beyond War all the time, because I am the Director of a national peace organization and their national offices are just down the street from me. I am frequently astonished at what they tell me. I was recently told, for example, that by pursuing the Beyond War program, we could make great strides in ending the Iran-Iraq war. What does one say to suchn incredibly naive and optimistic person? I say in Tehran there are millions of people who go to a public square and flagellate themselves in front of a huge fountain that pumps blood-red water. In Iran there have been systematic campaigns of elimination against whole populations of people, such as the Bahais. What on earth would th the average Shi'ite in Iran have in common with a bunch of Americans who sit around plush, middle class living rooms and talk about world peace? The Beyond War headquarters here in Palo Alto has generated a tremendous follow- ing of supporters in this area, and they are usually at any meeting of any peace-related activity. Their message is that if we will only "communicate" with the Soviet Union, that we should be able to work out our differences and live in peace. This message is almost completely empty of content. We do "communicate" withhe Soviet Union all the time, every day in fact, on a v variety of issues. We simply don't agree with them, nor is it likely that we will in the near future. Anyone who has ever spoken to a Soviet official (or watched the "Citizens' Summit on TV) knows how frustrating it is to talk with an ideological mouthpiece. When Soviet officials say that the tanks had to roll into Prague, or Budapest, or Kabul, in order to "save socialism," and save the people of those unfortunate countries from dreaded U.S. imperialism, one can do nothing but look at them in mute wonder. The admonition that we must "communicate" with these people sounds ludicrous. I am not one to equate the Soviet Union with the Nazi government of Germany, because I think that does a great disservice to the heroism of the Soviet people in fighting fascism. But few people would disagree that war was the only way to deal with Hitler (or Japan, for that matter). Why people would think that this cannot possibly happen again is Beyond Me. Gary Chapman ------------------------------ Date: Sat, 4 Jan 86 22:33:04 EST From: Clifford Johnson @MC.LCS.MIT.EDU Subject: Rejoinders | | | From: Clifford Johnson | | 2. LEGITIMATE DEFENSE NEEDS: I think it dangerous, and erroneous, | to restrict the analysis of "legitimate defense needs" to categories | of hardware such as subs, carriers, .... The command and control | capabilities themselves may be characterized as "illegitimate", as I | allege with LOWC. | |You have it wrong. The problem is not with the hardware, but rather |with the missions they are supposed to perform. We may argue about |whether LOW is the right way to insure missile invulnerability, but we |agree that the mission of protecting our retaliatory force is |legitimate. Fair comment. But the talk has been mostly about hardware. I wanted to make this "mission-generalization" concept explicit. The analysis must then first identify the defense missions, then the operational systems that support them. There are two sources of "illegitimacy". First, can a mission itself be "illegitimate"? (I would suggest that a mission to maintain superiority in some arenas of war is illegitimate, because its adoption by hostile nations implies an endless arms race.) Second, the operational procedures to achieve missions may be "illegitimate". (Use of weapons banned by international law, etc. ERCS was a bad example, but it's easy to imagine a battle management system preprogrammed to escalate conflict, for example you fire one at me then I'll fire 20 at you and 10 at your friends.) If superiority at sea is a legitimate defense mission, then aircraft carriers are obviously a legitimate defense need, although (like ERCS) they may be a dumb expense. | | 3. THE WEAKNESS OF INTERNATIONAL TREATIES: (Response to Richard | Foy's alleged violation of Limited Test Ban Treaty.) Related to the | above is the simple fact that the very possession of nuclear weapons | has been declared illegal by the United Nations. This declaration | is, however, not construed as BINDING on U.N. members. | |If it's not binding, there are no laws to be violated, and nothing is |illegal. | That's my point - the weakness of international law. A basic premise of even such law as is "binding" is that nevertheless each State has the prerogative to construe the language of a treaty however it pleases, and to change its interpretation at any time. | 4. LIMITED NUCLEAR WAR: Robert Maas suggests this is not *actual* | U.S. policy. It was in 1945, and first-use is the foundation of | NATO's present defense plans. | |First use is NOT the same thing as limited nuclear war. Ike's massive |retaliation was also "first use", and it has nothing to do with |limited war. First-use and limited nuclear war are not the same, but you can't credibly pretend to have one without pretending to have the other. I'm afraid the Pershing IIs and presidential orders leave no doubt that US plans include limited nuclear options (see, e.g. Reagan's 1982 PD/NSC-53 which requires "responsive support for operational control of the armed forces, even during a protracted nuclear conflict.") ------------------------------ Date: Sat 4 Jan 86 19:36:57-PST From: Jim McGrath Subject: Re: Testing SDI Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa From: Herb Lin From: Jim McGrath What if, after suitable advance notice, the SDI system was fully activated and targeted against one of our periodic meteor swarms? Interesting example, but problematic. No kill assessment for one, under some circumstances. Entirely different signatures for another. It would test some aspects of the system on a system wide level (such as detection and tracking), and would even provide good kill estimates in some cases (KE weapons and small targets). But as I said: Meteors are just a casual example. My point is that the costs of partial (but system wide) testing does not have to lie with the targets (which many people seem to assume) as much as with weapons discharge - which may be quite manageable. But if the tests are to be realistic, then the right targets are essential, especially since a counter-measure is to try to fool with the targets that the defense sees. True, but remember that the major cost of the target simulation is in the boost phase. Once the targets are in sub-orbit, it makes no difference whether they were fired independently by hundreds of expensive boosters or were accelerated from orbital velocity, after having been place there originally through more economical means. Terminal phase tests are especially easy to do this way. Only boost phase is intrinsically expensive. (That's two messages where I've come up with approaches to problems that work on all phases except boost phase. Although initially attractive, perhaps concentrating more on mid-course and terminal defense will ultimately prove more beneficial.) Jim ------------------------------ End of Arms-Discussion Digest *****************************