Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!decvax!ucbvax!arms-d From: ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) Newsgroups: mod.politics.arms-d Subject: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #10.2 Message-ID: <8601060249.AA04018@ucbvax.berkeley.edu> Date: Sun, 5-Jan-86 18:43:00 EST Article-I.D.: ucbvax.8601060249.AA04018 Posted: Sun Jan 5 18:43:00 1986 Date-Received: Sun, 5-Jan-86 22:56:19 EST Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: ARMS-D%MIT-MC.ARPA@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU Organization: The ARPA Internet Lines: 189 Approved: arms-d@mit-mc.arpa Arms-Discussion Digest Sunday, January 5, 1986 6:43PM Volume 6, Issue 10.2 Today's Topics: See #10.1 ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Sat 4 Jan 86 21:52:13-PST From: Jim McGrath Subject: The Goal of SDI Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa From: Herb Lin We all, including the public, would like as high an X as possible, they would agree that losing a city or two and some missile bases/airfields would be a lot better than losing everything. But that is not the goal of the SDI. Which does not mean it should not be supported for that reason. Most government programs have consequences (sometimes good, sometimes bad) never conceived of in their initial purpose. That does not mean you ignore them when evaluating the program. I simply do not follow your logic at all. Do you want to score points against Reagan and Company? Or do you want to discuss strategic defense, and SDI as it is developing? I'm not interested in defending Reagan, just developing defense and seeing that it is done the best way possible. Jim ------------------------------ Date: Sat 4 Jan 86 22:12:56-PST From: Jim McGrath Subject: Politicians Reply-to: mcgrath%mit-oz@mit-mc.arpa From: Herb Lin Besides, complaints that politicians are lying do not sit well with me. Of course they are lying. WE WANT THEM TO LIE. Politicians who tell the truth get kicked out of office.... So you condone lying to the public as a tool of public policy? How would you like to acknowledge that publically in a letter to the NY Times? Don't forget to add that you support SDI, and that truth doesn't matter when you try to justify a weapon system -- never mind what it actually does. We can say that we will spend millions of dollars on AIDS research since that will save lives, and spend the money instead on nerve gas, which will also help to eliminate AIDS (by killing homosexual soldiers). You are arguing from emotion (almost hysterically), not reason, which I do not expect of you. I stated a fact: public officials must lie on many (not all) issues in order to retain office. (I could have said "evade," or just "keep quiet about" if the word "lie" hits you so hard - I see no functional distinction.) This is one thing that everyone, no matter what their policy perspective, agrees on (this comes from several graduate seminars, and personal experience). I did not say that I liked that state of affairs much. But I do not find it reasonable to blame the politicians. Rather, the fault lies with the voters. Unlike many of my friends in the social sciences, I do not concentrates on the "oughts" of the world. I focus on the empirical evidence. Perhaps it is the scientist in me. So when I observe a political system that punishes frank and honest talk about some issues (usually those, like nuclear war and taxes, that are too horrible to contemplate), I acknowledge this as a fact, and do not waste time decrying it. My decrying it is not (to the first approximation) going to change human nature. Thus my comment "we have to make do with what we have." Sorry; I believe that elected leaders have a responsibility to tell the truth to the public, and to educate them away from fairy tales. I would rather see precious defense dollars go to create good anti-tank weapons; that would have some chance of improving extended deterrence. Come on now. Leaders can only lead where people are, ultimately, willing to go. Just look at the nuclear freeze movement. This is the level at which the public thinks of nuclear war when it is forced to think. Finally, your last sentence shows that you missed my entire point. Congress (i.e. the people) will not budget for the necessary increases in conventional weapons (let alone the Europeans). Ultimately it does not matter what you or I like, it is what the people will accept. And if they act "irrationally," then I feel we cannot just sit back and demand that out "leaders" make them change their minds, or that the people change their stripes. Instead we should focus on the possible - which is, afterall, what politics is all about. Jim ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 5 Jan 86 13:18:45 EST From: Herb Lin Subject: railroads From: prandt!mikes at AMES-NAS.ARPA (Peter O. Mikes) at MC.LCS.MIT.EDU The relevance also escapes me: Are you implying that NATO forces have no capability of taking the action into the enemy territory or are you suggesting that NATO would use air-lift rather then railroads? If you would travel in those parts, you may find that not to be a bad choice. Your general point is right, but note that air lift doesn't give you large volume. For transport of many tanks, you need to go by ground. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 5 Jan 86 13:27:32 EST From: Herb Lin Subject: Boof Review [sic] From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry at ucbvax.berkeley.edu > DON'T treat nuclear weapons like other weapons. As I recall it, this is directly contradictory to Soviet military philosophy, which explicitly declares nuclear weapons (tactical ones, anyway) to be just bigger and nastier forms of artillery. The big black dividing line between "conventional" and "nuclear" is largely a Western idea, not shared by the Soviets much. Or so I recall; this is not an area I'm expert in. This makes me skeptical about the book (which I have not seen yet) -- just how aware are its authors of the differences between Western and Soviet military thought? Old US doctrine (~1955) said that conventional and nuclear weapons were the same too. Recent Soviet military writing does distinguish between C and N weapons. One of the contributors to the book is Steve Meyer, recognized as the nation's leading expert on Sov military thought -- his chapter on Sov nuclear policy is superb; on the other hand, many reviewers have panned the book as a whole (but praising his chapter). ------------------------------ Date: 5 Jan 86 13:30:33 EST From: Hank.Walker@UNH.CS.CMU.EDU Subject: Man in SDI Loop Dave Parnas pointed out that we can't write expert systems to do things like target discrimination, because we don't have any human experts in this area (given the available sensor input). Humans can't watch everything (try playing Defender at 10X normal speed), and so must depend on the computer indicating when there's a problem, which brings us nearly all the way back to square one. ------------------------------ Date: Sun, 5 Jan 86 15:39:11 EST From: Herb Lin Subject: [GA.CJJ: Limited Nuclear War] Date: Sun, 5 Jan 86 11:15:47 PST From: Clifford Johnson To: LIN at MC.LCS.MIT.EDU Re: Limited Nuclear War REPLY TO 01/04/86 19:39 FROM LIN@MC.LCS.MIT.EDU: Rejoinders CORRECTION: The quote on "protracted nuclear conflict" was from a 1979 Presidential Directive NSC-53; Reagan's Pentagon went further in FY 1984-1988 Defense Guidelines (March 1982), which outlined a comprehensive strategy for fighting a nuclear war, and reportedly stated US nuclear capabilities "must prevail even under the condition of a prolonged war" (NY Times, Jun.21, 1982). ------------------------------ End of Arms-Discussion Digest *****************************