Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!decvax!ucbvax!arms-d From: ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) Newsgroups: mod.politics.arms-d Subject: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #11.3 Message-ID: <8601070308.AA22410@ucbvax.berkeley.edu> Date: Mon, 6-Jan-86 17:46:00 EST Article-I.D.: ucbvax.8601070308.AA22410 Posted: Mon Jan 6 17:46:00 1986 Date-Received: Wed, 8-Jan-86 01:43:12 EST Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: ARMS-D%MIT-MC.ARPA@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU Organization: The ARPA Internet Lines: 134 Approved: arms-d@mit-mc.arpa Arms-Discussion Digest Monday, January 6, 1986 5:46PM Volume 6, Issue 11.3 Today's Topics: KAL007 Deep Strike ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 09:52:54 EST From: Michael_Joseph_Edelman%Wayne-MTS%UMich-MTS.Mailnet@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA Re: KAL007 > Date: Fri, 3 Jan 86 14:47:30 PST > From: Clifford Johnson > To: LIN at MIT-MC.ARPA > Re: Government secrecy and KAL007 > > ...In summary: (1) I am not claiming PROOF that KAL007 was a spy > flight, merely that substantial conflicting evidence exists, and US > government secrecy inevitably gives rise to the conclusion that > US/USSR roles in the matter =Tweedledum/Tweedledee; (2) nowhere does > anyone illuminate the secret Congressional inquiry into KAL007 > precipitated in Sept. 1985 by testimony that the flight was > intentional; And no one can- the inquiry was secret, right? All we have is hearsay evidence of what was reported to have been discussed, with no sources, documents, etc. > First and foremost, the supposedly definitive American Spectator > (October, 1985) article on KAL007 does not rebut ANY of the specific > - the Defense Electronics (March, 1984) article I quoted received no > attention whatsoever from Oberg in his supposedly exhaustive review > of the literature... Fair enough. Let's look at those points: 1) KAL007 was delayed for 40 minutes for an equipment check that revealed no malfunction. But this is a very common occurence in commercial aircraft, and Sayle notes that the craft in question had a previous history of minor navigation equipment problems. 2) The delay synchronized KAL007 with the pass overhead of a ferret satellite. This seems to be a mis-quoting of the "P.Q. Mann" article (by Defense Electronics) in which the supposed use of a ferret satellite in 1964 was invoked to prove complicity of the space shuttle in the KAL007 incident. It hasn't been quoted anywhere else. 3) "The mission required KAL's top pilot and co-pilot..."(this is again affirming the consequent) "...both having known US Intelligence connections...(proof by assertion- well known to whom? What source can you quote?) "...and a flight crew of 29 instead of the normal 18..." I assume this refers to the RC-135 crew. As noted by Oberg, Pearson's sources for RC-135 operations procedure were two crew members who flew on very different missions on a different RC-135 fifteen years ago. 4) "The steady course of KAL007 required several inflight checks..." But as Sayle notes, KAL007 flew a steady magnetic heading of 246 throughout its flight. An airline on autopilot requires no such checks. The filed flight plan would have required the crew to have reset the inertial guidance system waypoints twice during the flight, true; but if the autopilot was on a magnetic heading the crew would never have been alerted to reset waypoints- until they either noted that they seemed to have been on course for too long, or were alerted by some other means. > > Here is the news story I referred to re the Congressional inquiry: > > Am American lawyer involved in a damages suit on > behalf of the victims of the crash says the pilot's widow told him > and three other lawyers that the pilot and co-pilot were paid extra > to fly over Soviet territory. There has also been evidence that the > airliner's course was known and that an air traffic controller said > 'We should warn him'. The sub-committee is also expected to > investigate the destruction of a tape by the US Air Force." > None of this has been instantiated as of this writing. Was the pilot paid extra to "fly over Soviet territory" or to fly a potentially hazardous route? I suppose the eventual trial may provide answers. > ...I read a wire story I think probably true, which > quoted an unnamed Air Force official who stated that the US Air > Force recurrently fitted commercial passenger planes of friendly > foreign nations with spying equipment at a base in New Mexico. The > fitting was formally at the friendly nations' request, and I believe > certain African nations were example customers. There was a hint > that such activity would be performed in future outside of the US on > account of the Korean incident. That's my memory of the article. I'd like to see more on this. We suspect, but do not know, that the USSR does this regularly. A few times every month Aeroflot airliners are are intercepted and diverted by the USAF after the airliners make unauthorized low-level passes over military bases on the east coast; this may be a common practice around the world. John Le Carre aludes to it in one of his novels. But what is usually claimed is that such missions are photo recon, not electronic ferreting, which require far more equipment than can be stuffed in the nose of a 747 and a crew to operate the equipment. What it boils down to, for me, is that there is no concievable mission that KAL007 could have accomplished that could not have been accomplished better by other craft. ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 10:35:08 EST From: Michael_Joseph_Edelman%Wayne-MTS%UMich-MTS.Mailnet@MIT-MULTICS.ARPA re: Deep Strike > > From: Herb Lin > > From: Gary Chapman > This is why we have moved to the dangerous doctrine of deep strike, > "follow-on-forces-attack," and an increased offensive capability. > > I concur that these are destabilizing. Given my position that the > conventional military situation in Europe isn't as bleak as people > usually claim, the recommendations that follow can safely get rid of > deep strike etc. Given the position that the conventional situation > is as bleak as is believed, then there really aren't many alternatives > to deep strike. > "Follow on" and "deep strike" are a consequence of NATO's politically (rather than militarily) motivated notion of "forward defense". Rather than allowing an attacking enemy to overextend themselves before counterattaking, NATO prefers a replay of Normandy, stopping the expected Soviet attack at the German border. The alternative is to junk forward defense in favor of a more flexible doctrine, but Germany would never stand for a policy that would have the entire of WWIII fought on German soil. ------------------------------ End of Arms-Discussion Digest *****************************