Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!decvax!decwrl!amdcad!lll-crg!ucdavis!ucbvax!arms-d From: ARMS-D-Request@MIT-MC.ARPA (Moderator) Newsgroups: mod.politics.arms-d Subject: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #12.1 Message-ID: <8601072303.AA10523@ucbvax.berkeley.edu> Date: Tue, 7-Jan-86 17:50:00 EST Article-I.D.: ucbvax.8601072303.AA10523 Posted: Tue Jan 7 17:50:00 1986 Date-Received: Wed, 8-Jan-86 03:11:17 EST Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: ARMS-D%MIT-MC.ARPA@XX.LCS.MIT.EDU Organization: The ARPA Internet Lines: 171 Approved: arms-d@mit-mc.arpa Arms-Discussion Digest Tuesday, January 7, 1986 5:50PM Volume 6, Issue 12.1 Today's Topics: McGrath on politicians Soviet offensive strategy Re: Book Review Automatic weapons Re: Testing SDI Re: Another SDI Problem "deltufo%d"@lll-mfe.arpa Re: Re: KAL007 Putting a Man into the Loop The Goal of SDI Politicians Aversion to Nuclear War Soviet Defense more carriers in action international law More on Soviet Defense Soviet Defense request for hostile reviewer Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V6 #10.2 cybernetic process Congressional lying KAL007 Mission cybernetic process WWI,WWII & Beyond War ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Date: 6 Jan 1986 18:46-EST From: Nicholas.Spies@H.CS.CMU.EDU Subject: McGrath on politicians Jim McGrath writes: "... Rather, the fault lies with the voters. Unlike many of my friends in the social sciences, I do not concentrate on the "oughts" of the world. I focus on the empirical evidence. Perhaps it is the scientist in me." Perhaps the fault (for the less-than-ingenuous quality of politicians) should also be laid on the shoulders of those scientists who feel that because of the "fact" that the political system "...punishes frank and honest talk about some issues..." that it is not worth the bother to "...waste time decrying it" because of not being able to "... change human nature". Why are so many scientists able to offer their "objective views" while losing sight of the political implications of their views or even acknowledge that the latter exist? C'on Faust, WHY did you sell your soul to the Devil anyway? (And why is the rest of the world's population hanging on your every word as we travel down the road to a high-tech death?) ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 17:11:26 pst From: Gary Chapman Subject: Soviet offensive strategy Re Jeff Miller's note that the Soviet Union started a deep-strike, offensive force structure before NATO: I am aware of the OMG's; they came into existence about 1976, just about the same time the United States started reevaluating its strategic doctrine in Western Europe. But Soviet OMG's are not, to my knowledge part of a full strategic realignment. They are tactical units that are assigned a particular mission that corresponds roughly to the deep-strike missions now assigned to NATO units. When Airland Battle came on line (and it's not Airland Battle 2000, by the way--that's a different bird altogether; the original name for FM 100-5 was Airland Battle, now changed to Army 20), the military started a top-to-bottom rethinking of its strategic concepts. Now the U.S. Army trains specifically in deep-strike tactics in the periodic Reforger exercises in Western Europe. Again, to my knowledge, there is no comparable change in Soviet strategic thinking. ------------------------------ Date: Mon 6 Jan 86 17:36:39-PST From: Jim McGrath Subject: Re: Book Review From: ihnp4!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu Jim McGrath quotes the following as part of the conclusions from "Hawks, Doves, and Owls: An Agenda for Avoiding Nuclear War": > 10 Reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence over the long term. > DO assume that nuclear deterrence will last forever. > DON'T intensify the search for alternatives to deterrence. Did those sub-points get reversed, or am I missing something subtle? Of course, you are right - the sense should be reversed. (They listed all of the other nine recommendations in the DO then DON'T order, and reversed on the last one - and I was too tired to catch it at the time). Jim ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 Jan 86 17:30:18 pst From: Gary Chapman Subject: Automatic weapons I'm not as fluent in military history as some people here are, but I always thought we started giving every soldier a fully automatic weapon because they would do a job semi-automatics don't do. Fully automatic weapons are more effective in the jungle, for example, and it was in the South Pacific during World War II that the use of Thompson submachine guns became widespread. During Korea, there was little need for fully automatic weapons, and a greater need for the accuracy of semi-automatics; consequently, few troops in Korea had full automatics. In Vietnam, we returned to the full automatic because of the presence of jungle--but the use of "rock n' roll," as we called the full auto position, was highly discouraged. It was terribly inaccurate and wasted ammu- nition like crazy. In Vietnam there was for some people a thing about carrying exotic automatic weapons like Swedish K's, Uzis and even Thompsons. But for people who wanted to come home in one piece, there was a very-unexotic weapon of choice: the M-14. It's full automatic mode wasn't very impressive, and it was heavy, but it was 10 times more accurate than the M-16, unbelievably reliable, and it could fire the same rounds as an AK-47, which meant if you found enemy ammo caches you could use theirs. Also, about firing: a good friend of mine, a company commander in Vietnam, told me that his best achievement in the war was that he never drew his weapon. And this guy was in the soup, believe it--he was a company commander in the 1st Expeditionary Force in the Marines, the first conventional line unit in 'Nam. Anyone who knows about command on the front line knows that NOT drawing your weapon is something to be extraordinarily proud of. The WORST thing you could have happen to you, what would've scared the bejeesus out of me, would be to be in a trench with some pie-eyed slobbering FNG who was melting his barrel with fully automatic fire. I would have immediately known he wasn't hitting anything and he was only spraying the grass and trees out of pure fear. Not something to instill confidence and keep you going... ------------------------------ Date: Mon 6 Jan 86 18:01:12-PST From: Jim McGrath Subject: Re: Testing SDI From: Paul Dietz Actually, testing even the midcourse and terminal phases of a BMD system is not likely to be fully practical... (Many points follow) You are, of course, correct. It is NEVER possible to fully test ANY system until it is actually used in battle (and even then it can fail in future battles). My point was more that SDI (always excepting boost phase) could be tested according to the same type of standards we currently use to test other complex weapon systems (or computer systems, etc...). That is, the SDI testing problem is indeed a problem, but not one radically different from those that have already been encountered (and "solved"), or those likely to be encountered in the future. Thus attention should be focused on HOW to do the tests, not on decrying that the testing problem is somehow inherently impossible to solve. Jim ------------------------------ End of Arms-Discussion Digest *****************************