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From: john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley)
Newsgroups: net.abortion
Subject: Re: a task for those opposed to abortion
Message-ID: <388@cisden.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 8-Jan-86 13:29:58 EST
Article-I.D.: cisden.388
Posted: Wed Jan  8 13:29:58 1986
Date-Received: Sun, 12-Jan-86 07:30:50 EST
References: <1100@oddjob.UUCP> <1730@druxu.UUCP> <1101@oddjob.UUCP>
Reply-To: john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley)
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Organization: ConTel Information Systems, Denver
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Adrian Kent has given us a valiant and thoughtful shot at saying how to
forbid the killing of adults but allow the killing of foetuses.  But I
don't think his arguments against murder hold water.

In article <1101@oddjob.UUCP> apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) writes:
>       				 I certainly can't make an argument 
>against killing adult humans IN ALL CIRCUMSTANCES, because I don't believe
>that's a tenable moral position. But I'll give you two arguments which suggest
>that it's generally wrong to kill people. 

(Maybe we should limit the question to whether it is allowable ever to
kill an adult who is not trying to harm anyone, and is innocent of any
crime.  This eliminates a couple of potential side-lines, but leaves
the analogy to abortion intact -- the child is *at worst* unintentionally
harming someone and is certainly guilty of nothing.)

>(1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is
>intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral action."Good" is a term which reflects my personal values, some of which will become
>apparent. This is a likely source of controversy. If, for example, you maintain
>that your values place the life of a member of homo sapiens above all else, you
>will produce a consistent moral position against abortion. I would criticise 
>your values as arbitrary and speciesist, and would ask whether you really would
>destroy a planet of intelligent, friendly, talented aliens rather than a single
>human. But, if you steadfastly maintain your position, I certainly can't prove
>that it's logically wrong. 

First, I don't think I've ever heard anyone say that his value system
placed the lives of humans "above all else".  I object on moral grounds
to killing humans, but I would have exactly the same objection to killing
any *person*, regardless of species.  Angels being immortal and
extraterrestrials hypothetical, we're left with _homo_sapiens_.

Next, a general problem with utilitarianism.  Dostoievski posed the
problem:  Suppose there is a city, somewhere, whose inhabitants are happy
and prosperous and healthy.  They have a high culture, universal peace,
and so on.  The catch is this -- the whole thing depends on the existence
of a single child kept in a dungeon somewhere, starved, ignorant, neglected,
sick, tortured.  And the whole city with its millions of inhabitants will
lose its magical peace and prosperity and happiness should this child ever
be released.  Is it worth it?  Can anything worth while be built on
deliberate cruelty and injustice?  (Dostoievski and I say No.)

But utilitarianism -- "the greatest good of the greatest number" --
clearly would say Yes.  So are you really a utilitarian?  If so, what do
you say about the child in the dungeon?  (Or the ones under the curette?)

>(2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities
>which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity).
>I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character", emphasising that
>they combine to produce a whole world-view and behaviour-pattern. Mostly,
>people have characters which are on balance good. (Here and afterwards, it 
>should be understood that I'm using my values.) Corpses have no discernible
>character, so people with good characters are better for the world than corpses,all else being equal. I therefore enjoin you not to kill people with good      
>character.  This argument does not apply to abortion, since the character of a 
>foetus is little-developed. 

The problem with this whole line is that it explains why *you* don't like
to kill adults, but it doesn't give you any ground on which to criticize
someone who *does* like to.  It bases everything on your personal likes.

I happen to like and value the character of foetuses -- innocence, vast
but yet-untapped potential, smallness, complexity, rapid development.  So
what?  

>(3) Second argument. A society in which each member evaluated the character of
>her sisters and brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad, 
>would be a less pleasant society than one in which adult human life was         generally protected. It is therefore moral for each of us to try to uphold 
>respect for adult life, and immoral to diminish such respect (again, all else
>being equal). Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the
>general respect for adult life.

Notice how you keep having to (arbitrarily) specify "adult" life.  What's
happened here is that you yourself have already "evaluated the character"
of certain of your brothers and sisters (the very young), and "felt free
to kill those" you regard as having "character" not up to *your* criteria.
And I agree, it makes for an unpleasant society.  Killing people, of
whatever age, tends to diminish the respect for human life.

>			Some might (and do) argue that this establishes
>the immorality of abortion: that the lack of respect for human life shown by
>society's tolerance of abortion has wider social consequences. This is an 
>empirical rather than a moral question: if I were persuaded of its truth then
>I would alter my views on abortion. However, I am not presently convinced.
>I believe that a clearly-established social contract is in effect,     
>under which it is permissible to kill foetuses in certain circumstances, and
>this is understood to have no implications beyond birth. An absolutely firm
>dividing line, such as birth, is necessary to avoid the individual decisions
>about human worth which I argued above were deleterious. So, though I was 
>asked to consider only adults, the same argument suggests that killing children
>is wrong.  

Remember back in the late sixties, all the pro-Life people were warning
that widespread abortion was bound to lead to infanticide and the killing
of senile adults, and so on?  And all the liberals said pooh-pooh?  Well,
we sure see it happening, now, don't we?  Medical journals discuss "options
of non-treatment", not just for comatose, but for the "pleasantly senile".
Deformed babies are starved to death in hospitals, while courts uphold
the parents' "rights" to starve their babies if they want.  

Your "absolutely firm dividing line" has been crossed an awful lot the
last few years, and the reason is that it's not really that firm.  A
nine-month foetus, ready to be born, is obviously and clearly alive and
human, just as much as she is a month later -- the dividing line of
birth is, if anything, just a matter of arbitrary convenience.  And,
like all such lines, when it becomes more convenient to violate it than
to observe it, it gets violated.

>" Salome, dear, NOT in the fridge."

My nomination for the funniest signature line on the whole net.
-- 
				Peace and Good!,
				      Fr. John Woolley
"The heart has its reasons that the mind does not know." -- Blaise Pascal