Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site boulder.UUCP Path: utzoo!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest!sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!hplabs!hao!nbires!boulder!richard From: richard@boulder.UUCP (Richard Byrd) Newsgroups: net.abortion Subject: Re: a task for those opposed to abortion Message-ID: <286@boulder.UUCP> Date: Sat, 11-Jan-86 04:15:19 EST Article-I.D.: boulder.286 Posted: Sat Jan 11 04:15:19 1986 Date-Received: Tue, 14-Jan-86 03:33:21 EST References: <1100@oddjob.UUCP> <365@cisden.UUCP> Reply-To: richard@boulder.UUCP Distribution: na Organization: University of Colorado, Boulder Lines: 37 I think the recently made request for elucidation of the basis of the immorality of murder is a very relevant to the abortion question. Everyone agrees that murder is immoral and should be illegal. People disagree as to whether abortion is murder. Indeed, the question of whether abortion is murder is to a great extent a matter of definition, and peoples' definitions vary. Thus it is quite appropriate to go a level deeper and examine why we believe murder is so wrong and then see if these reasons apply to abortion. Why and when murder is wrong can be a very subtle question, but I would like to note some simple points that I hope are not too controversial. I think that I, and most other people, oppose murder primarily because of the suffering caused to the person killed. When we are shocked and disturbed on hearing of a murder, I think it is because of the thought of what it would be like for us to be killed. A person who once had a life to look forward to now has nothing. Along the same vein, if murder were legal and universally permitted our lives would be full of uncertainty and terror. Thus we make murder illegal. Note that our sympathy for the victim and our horror at the act seem related to the victim's consciousness of his life. For most of us these arguments do not apply to killing animals. It appears that we don't think that animals have enough consciousness of their lives to make the prospect of losing it a source of great anguish. (However, for the higher animals "cruelty to animals" laws do attempt to limit the purely physical suffering and pain involved in killing animals.) In the case of a fetus, it seems clear that in the earliest stages of development there is no pain, much less consciousness, and the above arguments against murder do not apply. As the fetus develops, my understanding is that there is sensation of pain, but how much more consciousness exists is debatable. Therefore it seems that to understand the morality of abortion we must have a deeper understanding of the nature of the fetus. Of course, a different basis for regarding murder as immoral might lead one to different conclusions regarding abortion.