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From: apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent)
Newsgroups: net.abortion
Subject: Re: a task for those opposed to abortion
Message-ID: <1114@oddjob.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 14-Jan-86 02:52:18 EST
Article-I.D.: oddjob.1114
Posted: Tue Jan 14 02:52:18 1986
Date-Received: Thu, 16-Jan-86 01:32:35 EST
References: <1100@oddjob.UUCP> <1730@druxu.UUCP> <1101@oddjob.UUCP> <388@cisden.UUCP>
Reply-To: apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent)
Followup-To: net.abortion
Distribution: na
Organization: U. Chicago, Astronomy & Astrophysics
Lines: 137
Summary: replies to some points raised.


      There's been a lot of interesting followup to my original question (should
an atheist moral philosopher oppose abortion?) and subsequent arguments (which
suggested that a reasonable, consistent moral position exists that distinguishesbetween the killing of adults and of foetuses). Some of it's come by private    mail. At the moment, I'm having (machine) trouble replying to that, so I'll try
to respond here. Quotes are from John Woolley's article: I apologise for any
misquotation or misattribution of other people's points.
(> John Woolley     >> Adrian Kent)
      
In article <388@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes:

>>(1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is
>>intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral action."Good" is a term which reflects my personal values, some of which will become
>>apparent. This is a likely source of controversy. If, for example, you maintain
>>that your values place the life of a member of homo sapiens above all else, you
>>will produce a consistent moral position against abortion. I would criticise 
>>your values as arbitrary and speciesist, and would ask whether you really would
>>destroy a planet of intelligent, friendly, talented aliens rather than a single
>>human. But, if you steadfastly maintain your position, I certainly can't prove
>>that it's logically wrong. 
>
>First, I don't think I've ever heard anyone say that his value system
>placed the lives of humans "above all else".  I object on moral grounds
>to killing humans, but I would have exactly the same objection to killing
>any *person*, regardless of species.  Angels being immortal and
>extraterrestrials hypothetical, we're left with _homo_sapiens_.
    The point I'm tryng to make is that a creature ought to be treated 
according to its attributes, not its species. Extraterrestrials may be
hypothetical, but they're very useful in analysing someone's moral position.
I'd like to know how you recognise a "person". What qualities does a race
have to possess in order to qualify? And is it possible for only some members
of a race to qualify, or do you have to judge the question species by species?
I think these are crucial questions of principle, and lie at the root of    
our differing conclusions.

>Next, a general problem with utilitarianism.  Dostoievski posed the
>problem:  Suppose there is a city, somewhere, whose inhabitants are happy
>and prosperous and healthy.  They have a high culture, universal peace,
>and so on.  The catch is this -- the whole thing depends on the existence
>of a single child kept in a dungeon somewhere, starved, ignorant, neglected,
>sick, tortured.  And the whole city with its millions of inhabitants will
>lose its magical peace and prosperity and happiness should this child ever
>be released.  Is it worth it?  [ .... ]  (Dostoievski and I say No.)
>But utilitarianism -- "the greatest good of the greatest number" --
>clearly would say Yes.  So are you really a utilitarian?  If so, what do
>you say about the child in the dungeon?  (Or the ones under the curette?)
    Firstly, I don't agree with the unequivocal claim that utilitarianism 
would say Yes. I need to know more about the hypothesis. If, when the child
is released, at least one other child within the city will incur equivalent
suffering AND lots of good things will be lost, then you're right about the
utilitarian conclusion. I agree with that conclusion: it seems like common 
sense. On the other hand, if the only consequence of releasing the child is 
that lots of good things will be lost, then a utilitarian's moral opinion
will depend on her values. So I'll assume the latter hypothesis, which probably
interests you more. I think that, if enough good things are lost, there comes
a point at which I would not release the child. Suppose, for instance, the 
alternative is that everyone in the city loses all interest in everything 
except basic human needs: that empathy, art, curiosity all vanish. That seems
worse to me than the child's suffering. Take another example (from "Country of
the Kind", author forgotten). Suppose that the human disposition to violence
can completely be removed, but that in the process all artistic ability and
appreciation is lost. Is the suffering saved worth the cost? 
     So, am I really a utilitarian? As I've said elsewhere, I think          
utilitarianism has flaws, but it's a good rule of thumb. What do I say about  
the child in the dungeon? That, if I knew that after making my moral choice
I would be randomly assigned a role in society (P(AK=child)=0.000001, 
P(AK=city-dweller)=0.999999), I would make the same choice. 
I see no analogy with the children/foetuses under the curette, either
in terms of suffering or in terms of personal loss; you can't take away freedom
from someone who doesn't have it.  
>
>>(2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities
>>which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity).
>>I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character", emphasising that
>>they combine to produce a whole world-view and behaviour-pattern. Mostly,
>>people have characters which are on balance good. (Here and afterwards, it 
>>should be understood that I'm using my values.) Corpses have no discernible
>>character, so people with good characters are better for the world than       
>>corpses.  This argument does not apply to abortion, since the character of a 
>>foetus is little-developed. 
>
>The problem with this whole line is that it explains why *you* don't like
>to kill adults, but it doesn't give you any ground on which to criticize
>someone who *does* like to.  It bases everything on your personal likes.
    It's certainly true that moral philosophy is value-dependent. Whether
that's a problem is debatable: I think it's simply a recognition of the fact
that there are no absolute moral truths. It's also true that I have no grounds
(other than what are essentially aesthetic ones) for criticizing someone who
likes killing adults, as long as she doesn't actually do it. And ultimately,
if she sincerely believes that killing and being killed are both good things,
I may have to concede that, under her consistent moral system, she is justified
in killing. That doesn't stop me from preventing her from doing so, of course.
    So yes, though one can argue over the reasonableness of a set of values,
one can not necessarily prove a set of values to be wrong. But what normally
happens is that people's stated values prove to be incoherent, or inconsistently
applied. That's why moral debates can be useful.
>
>I happen to like and value the character of foetuses -- innocence, vast
>but yet-untapped potential, smallness, complexity, rapid development.  So
>what?  
   Well, if those are seriously meant to be the primary reasons why you value
foetuses (which I doubt), then it seems to follow that you ought to value 
a sperm and unfertilised egg (together) at least as much. So the general 
pattern is: X states values, Y draws conclusions, X accepts conclusions or
refines values, ....   I don't know whether you consider that a good pastime,
but at least it keeps moral philosophers off the street.

[There follows a section in which I give a second argument against killing,
which John Woolley comments on. I've omitted it to save space; see his article.]
       
>
>Remember back in the late sixties, all the pro-Life people were warning
>that widespread abortion was bound to lead to infanticide and the killing
>of senile adults, and so on?  And all the liberals said pooh-pooh?  Well,
>we sure see it happening, now, don't we?  Medical journals discuss "options
>of non-treatment", not just for comatose, but for the "pleasantly senile".
>Deformed babies are starved to death in hospitals, while courts uphold
>the parents' "rights" to starve their babies if they want.  
>
>Your "absolutely firm dividing line" has been crossed an awful lot the
>last few years, and the reason is that it's not really that firm.  A
>nine-month foetus, ready to be born, is obviously and clearly alive and
>human, just as much as she is a month later -- the dividing line of
>birth is, if anything, just a matter of arbitrary convenience.  And,
>like all such lines, when it becomes more convenient to violate it than
>to observe it, it gets violated.
    Similar points were made to me in private mail by Charli Phillips, for 
which I'm grateful. I agree that this part of my previous argument doesn't
stand up. I'll come back to this question in a later posting, if and when
I think I have anything sensible to say about it.

>>" Salome, dear, NOT in the fridge."
>My nomination for the funniest signature line on the whole net.
>				      Fr. John Woolley
Credit to Marion Hill, who supplied this in a 1957 New Statesman competition
for gruesome one-liners. 
                          regards,
                                  ak