Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site cisden.UUCP Path: utzoo!decvax!decwrl!pyramid!pesnta!hplabs!hao!nbires!boulder!cisden!john From: john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) Newsgroups: net.abortion Subject: Re: a task for those opposed to abortion Message-ID: <431@cisden.UUCP> Date: Mon, 20-Jan-86 16:28:15 EST Article-I.D.: cisden.431 Posted: Mon Jan 20 16:28:15 1986 Date-Received: Sat, 25-Jan-86 05:26:31 EST References: <1100@oddjob.UUCP> <1730@druxu.UUCP> <1101@oddjob.UUCP> <388@cisden.UUCP> <1114@oddjob.UUCP> Reply-To: john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) Distribution: na Organization: ConTel Information Systems, Denver Lines: 102 Adrian Kent and I both tend to be verbose. I'll try to pare things down a lot here. It shouldn't be too opaque if you've been reading the discussion. And may I once again remark how nice it is to have some civilised debate going on around here? In article <1114@oddjob.UUCP> apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) writes: >I'd like to know how you recognise a "person". What qualities does a race >have to possess in order to qualify? And is it possible for only some members >of a race to qualify, or do you have to judge the question species by species? >I think these are crucial questions of principle, and lie at the root of >our differing conclusions. I use the ancient definition of "person": "An individual substance of a rational nature". From there, I answer that a race is "personal" if it is rational, if it can think and reason. (Realizing that these terms aren't strictly defined, we can agree anyway that humans are persons in this sense.) And, no, not "only some members" qualify. The question is whether the "nature" is rational, not the degree of rationality exhibited by the particular individual substance. So if we discover intelligent Martians (or whatever) I would object to killing them just the same as I object to killing humans. In response to my example of the child tortured to provide the good of the community: > Firstly, I don't agree with the unequivocal claim that utilitarianism >would say Yes. I need to know more about the hypothesis. If, when the child >is released, at least one other child within the city will incur equivalent >suffering AND lots of good things will be lost, then you're right about the >utilitarian conclusion. I agree with that conclusion: it seems like common >sense. [...] I think that, if enough good things are lost, there comes >a point at which I would not release the child. That's exactly the point of our disagreement. I and most traditional moralists, including every moralist I know of before about 1800, would say that deliberately inflicted injustice is always wrong, no matter what the perceived benefits might be. It is wrong to steal a dollar from somebody even though by doing so you can somehow give a dollar to each of a hundred other people. It is wrong to inflict suffering on the child in the example in order to benefit the society. So I think we really do disagree on this. But Western (Christian or liberal) legal and moral tradition is pretty much all on my side. > What do I say about >the child in the dungeon? That, if I knew that after making my moral choice >I would be randomly assigned a role in society (P(AK=child)=0.000001, >P(AK=city-dweller)=0.999999), I would make the same choice. Maybe I don't understand you here. I think you're saying that your willingness to take the one-in-a-million chance of being the one to suffer somehow justifies your choice. (Or makes it less unjust?) But I'm sure the average mugger willingly takes a greater chance than .000001 of being hurt or killed when he mugs, but we don't think his willingness to undergo the risk makes his violence any less inexcusable. Am I being dense? > It's certainly true that moral philosophy is value-dependent. Whether >that's a problem is debatable: I think it's simply a recognition of the fact >that there are no absolute moral truths. I don't object to moral philosophy's being value-dependent. But you seem to make it taste-dependent, which is another story. Values can be shared, debated, and so on. De gustibus, on the other hand, non disputandum est. (Ain't no 'countin' fer taste.) So if your big objection to murder is that you don't like it, well, I say you haven't done much philosophy. "FACT that there are no absolute moral truths"??? (Including this one...) All theists and "transcendentalists" say there are absolutes. Referring to my listing of several features of a foetus' character that I like (and I really do, by the way): > Well, if those are seriously meant to be the primary reasons why you value >foetuses (which I doubt), then it seems to follow that you ought to value >a sperm and unfertilised egg (together) at least as much. My point was that my tastes as to people's character don't have a lot to do with whether it should be legal to murder them. > So the general >pattern is: X states values, Y draws conclusions, X accepts conclusions or >refines values, .... I don't know whether you consider that a good pastime, >but at least it keeps moral philosophers off the street. It's fun, cheap, and doesn't rot your teeth. About the hazards of assuming that a firm artificial dividing line between human and non-human (e.g. birth) will hold up under fire: > Similar points were made to me in private mail by Charli Phillips, for >which I'm grateful. I agree that this part of my previous argument doesn't >stand up. I'll come back to this question in a later posting, if and when >I think I have anything sensible to say about it. Do. It's an important point. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas