Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site oddjob.UUCP
Path: utzoo!decvax!bellcore!petrus!sabre!zeta!epsilon!gamma!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxn!ihnp4!gargoyle!oddjob!apak
From: apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Arguments against murder
Message-ID: <1107@oddjob.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 8-Jan-86 01:10:25 EST
Article-I.D.: oddjob.1107
Posted: Wed Jan  8 01:10:25 1986
Date-Received: Thu, 9-Jan-86 03:04:46 EST
References: <1100@oddjob.UUCP> <1730@druxu.UUCP> <1101@oddjob.UUCP> <325@milano.UUCP>
Reply-To: apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent)
Distribution: na
Organization: U. Chicago, Astronomy & Astrophysics
Lines: 82
Summary: 

In article <325@milano.UUCP> wex@milano.UUCP writes:
>In article <1101@oddjob.UUCP>, apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent) tries to present
>some of his reasoning (not religiously-based) as to why one ought not to
>murder adult human beings.  This is something which is quite difficult to do,
>and Adrian makes several mistakes.  Lines beginning with >> are from Adrian.
      I agree it's difficult to do. I certainly haven't given a complete 
argument: that wouldn't have been appropriate even if it were possible. But
I don't accept that most of your criticisms relate to mistakes on my part.
At most, they put forward alternative points of view. 

>> ... I'll give you two arguments which suggest that it's generally wrong to
>> kill people.
>> (1) I start from a position of utilitarianism, so that an action which is
>> intended to produce the greatest good for the greatest number is a moral
>> action.
>
>Unfortunately, Adrian is starting from a position of *global* utilitarianism;
>that is, he feels that the principles of ut. are applicable by him to others.
>This is a very weak position, the reasons for which are better suited to 
>net.philosophy.  Let me give just one example, from real life, indicating some
>of the problems:  In Jamaica, there are Rastafarians who use ganja in their
>religion and in their everyday lives.  They believe that it increases their
>abilities, intellect, etc.  They tried quite hard to convice me that I was
>somehow incomplete because I didn't want to smoke it.  Now, if they held to the
>principle above, they would believe that it was moral for them to force me to
>smoke it.  Adrian can use his principle only because the large majority of his
>readers have very similar ideas of what is `the good.'
    Your example fails. There are all sorts of other factors which a utilitarianRastafarian would have to consider before deciding whether it was moral to forceyou to smoke ganja. For example, the value of the principle that people ought to
be permitted to make their own decisions. Incidentally, the only obvious 
alternative breed of utilitarianism that I can imagine is "greatest 
self-perceived good of the greatest number", and that seems a preposterous moralprinciple. Also incidentally, I think (global) utilitarianism has a number of
flaws, but is often a good rule of thumb. 
>
>> 
>> (2) First argument. Adult human beings tend to possess a variety of qualities
>> which I regard as valuable (for example, kindness, intelligence, creativity).
>> I'll refer to these qualities collectively as "character" ...
>> Corpses have no discernible character, so people with good characters are
>> better for the world than corpses, all else being equal. I therefore enjoin
>> you not to kill people with good character.  This argument does not apply to
>> abortion, since the character of a foetus is little-developed.
>
>Leaving aside the argument about the goodness of humans, I must point out that
>here, as elsewhere, you equate fetus with human.  This is clearly a fallacy,
>as debate here and elsewhere (including before the Supreme Court) has
>indicated that there is no way to `prove' when these two become the same.
   There's no way to prove the issue because it's entirely a matter of          definition. Nowhere have I drawn any moral consequences from the equation
foetus == human. 
>

>> Second argument. A society in which each member evaluated the character of
>> her sisters and brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad, 
>> would be a less pleasant society than one in which adult human life was
>> generally protected.
>
>I would like to point out that this, too, is an unsupported claim.
    Do you find it implausible, or do you just object to unsupported claims on
principle? 
>
>> Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the general respect
>> for adult life.
>
>Again, no support for this is given.  As a counter-example, consider the
>Vietnam conflict.  A great deal of opposition to the war could be traced to the
>daily body counts, augmented by grisly pictures every night on our TV screens.
>For years after (maybe even today) Americans were sensitive to when and where
>our troops were used.  Carter was quite proud of the fact that no American
>soldier was killed during his administration.
>
      Again, I don't think it's a very controversial statement. Do you really
think there was more general respect for adult life during the Vietnam war ?
Do you really think there's no *tendency* for violence to escalate? 
OK, maybe as a consequence of the Vietnam war there was some reluctance among
some Amercians for some time period for their country to fight again, but I
would suggest that this good is insignificant compared to the harm caused by
the war itself.

>--Alan Wexelblat
>-- 
>WEX@MCC.ARPA
>...ut-sally!im4u!milano!wex
                                         ak