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From: wex@milano.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Arguments against murder
Message-ID: <355@milano.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 8-Jan-86 18:06:05 EST
Article-I.D.: milano.355
Posted: Wed Jan  8 18:06:05 1986
Date-Received: Thu, 9-Jan-86 04:18:39 EST
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Disliking articles w/ many levels of inclusion, I will try to summarize.
Summaries are in {}.  I hope to get all summaries correct; point out where I
fail.

{Adrian Kent originally tried to present reasons why one ought not to murder
 adult human beings.  I presented what I thought were weaknesses in his
 reasons.  Inclusions are from Adrian's replies to that article.}

{Adrian agrees that it's difficult to present reasons why one ought not to
 murder adult humans; he feels that presentation is inappropriate and hard.
 Adrian takes global utilitarianism to be a good starting point.  I disagreed
 and presented the example of some Rasta-men I had met in Jamaica who tried
 quite hard to convice me that I was incomplete and unfree because I didn't
 smoke ganja.}

Adrian:
> Your example fails. There are all sorts of other factors which a utilitarian
> Rastafarian would have to consider before deciding whether it was moral to
> force you to smoke ganja. For example, the value of the principle that people
> ought to be permitted to make their own decisions.

I was not clear enough:  the Rasta-man believed that my mind was not free
because I was not high, and that therefore I could be treated as a child, and
*made* to do what was good for me.  This position is consistent with global ut.
The point I wish to make by this example is that global application of one's
beliefs of the good is not a good starting position.

{Adrian's argument is that people tend to have good/valuable qualities, called
 `character' which corpses lack.  Adrian assumes that having character in the
 world improves it, and therefore one ought not to kill "people with good
 character."}

This seems rather strange.  First, the presence or absence of character is not
something that can be objectively judged.  Second, what makes you assume that
the mere existence of such people improves the world?  Third, am I to assume
that you do not forbid the killing of people who lack "good character"?  What
about a sleeping person?  Surely he does not display good character.  The point
I wish to make is that you have not given sufficient reason for your moral
principle.

Adrian:
> A society in which each member evaluated the character of her sisters and
> brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad, would be a less
> pleasant society than one in which adult human life was generally protected.

I find this to be non-intuitive and also do not see how it supports your moral
principle.  Are morals based on general concepts like "less pleasant"?

> Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the general respect
> for adult life.

I do not think that this is a true statement.  I can give several counter-
examples (in addition to the example I gave of the effects of Vietnam on the
American consciousness).  Will it help if I do so, Adrian?  Can you give some
support to this claim?

--Alan Wexelblat
-- 
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