Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site oddjob.UUCP
Path: utzoo!decvax!decwrl!amdcad!lll-crg!qantel!ihnp4!oddjob!apak
From: apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Arguments against murder
Message-ID: <1110@oddjob.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 11-Jan-86 00:47:50 EST
Article-I.D.: oddjob.1110
Posted: Sat Jan 11 00:47:50 1986
Date-Received: Sun, 12-Jan-86 07:54:54 EST
References: <1100@oddjob.UUCP> <1730@druxu.UUCP> <1101@oddjob.UUCP> <1107@oddjob.UUCP> <355@milano.UUCP>
Reply-To: apak@oddjob.UUCP (Adrian Kent)
Distribution: na
Organization: U. Chicago, Astronomy & Astrophysics
Lines: 92

In article <355@milano.UUCP> wex@milano.UUCP writes:
>{Adrian Kent originally tried to present reasons why one ought not to murder
> adult human beings.  I presented what I thought were weaknesses in his
> reasons.  Inclusions are from Adrian's replies to that article.}
> Adrian takes global utilitarianism to be a good starting point.  I disagreed
> and presented the example of some Rasta-men I had met in Jamaica who tried
> quite hard to convice me that I was incomplete and unfree because I didn't
> smoke ganja.}
>
>Adrian:
>> Your example fails. There are all sorts of other factors which a utilitarian
>> Rastafarian would have to consider before deciding whether it was moral to
>> force you to smoke ganja. For example, the value of the principle that people
>> ought to be permitted to make their own decisions.
>
>I was not clear enough:  the Rasta-man believed that my mind was not free
>because I was not high, and that therefore I could be treated as a child, and
>*made* to do what was good for me.  This position is consistent with global ut.
>The point I wish to make by this example is that global application of one's
>beliefs of the good is not a good starting position.
  That position is certainly *consistent* with global utilitarianism, but it 
isn't a *consequence* of g.u.. It would follow from g.u. only given a particular
set of values on the part of the utilitarian. Now any attempt to establish an
ethical system is going to require an input of values, so you can't regard that
as a flaw of a *particular* system. Perhaps you don't; perhaps you regard *all*
ethical systems as equally flawed, for this reason? (That's a perfectly tenable 
and reasonable position, but if you do hold it then there's no point in trying
to produce moral arguments for you.)
>
>{Adrian's argument is that people tend to have good/valuable qualities, called
> `character' which corpses lack.  Adrian assumes that having character in the
> world improves it, and therefore one ought not to kill "people with good
> character."}
>
>This seems rather strange.  First, the presence or absence of character is not
>something that can be objectively judged.  Second, what makes you assume that
>the mere existence of such people improves the world?  Third, am I to assume
>that you do not forbid the killing of people who lack "good character"?  What
>about a sleeping person?  Surely he does not display good character.  The point
>I wish to make is that you have not given sufficient reason for your moral
>principle.
  Your first point makes me wonder whether we're talking completely at cross 
purposes. Moral philosophy is mainly about quantities which cannot be           
objectively judged. In particular, most of the values in any moral equation
are ultimately subjective. If we're going to debate the values (rather than
the moral calculus, say), then we have to accept that.  
  Now, secondly, why do I assume that the existence of good people (or, on
average, people) improves the world? Because I see around me all the time
people doing things which, on average, improve the world, and because I have
no reason to believe that the people I'm in contact with are especially
unrepresentative. Perhaps my use of the phrase "good character" was confusing?
It's not intended to mean that someone with "good character" is necessarily
moral; it means they do things which I value. We may disagree about the 
proportion of people with "good character", but isn't it almost tautological
to say that good character is good for the world?
  Thirdly, you are definitely not to assume that I do not forbid the killing
of people who lack good character. The fact that I give one argument against
killing does not imply that it's my only argument. In fact, in my earlier 
posting, I gave a second argument against killing, which applies regardless of
character. 
  There's a difference between possessing character and displaying it at a
particular instant in time. My arguments apply to the former, and so sleeping
people are not exempt. (If anyone tries to suggest that *this* implies foetuses
are also not exempt I shall scream.)   
>
>Adrian:
>> A society in which each member evaluated the character of her sisters and
>> brothers, and felt free to kill those she regarded as bad, would be a less
>> pleasant society than one in which adult human life was generally protected.
>
>I find this to be non-intuitive and also do not see how it supports your moral
>principle.  Are morals based on general concepts like "less pleasant"?
    Maybe I put it too abstractly. If people run around killing people they
don't like, and this is generally regarded as acceptable moral behaviour, then
life will be nasty, brutish and (to look on the bright side) short.
Yes, morals are based on values: pleasant was used because I get bored of 
repeating "good" or "which I value".
>> Killing people, of whatever character, tends to diminish the general respect
>> for adult life.
>
>I do not think that this is a true statement.  I can give several counter-
>examples (in addition to the example I gave of the effects of Vietnam on the
>American consciousness).  Will it help if I do so, Adrian?  Can you give some
>support to this claim?
Remember the context of the statement: it's in an argument against individuals 
killing other individuals because they regard their "character" as "bad". 
Within that context I think it's true, if a little vague. Classic contemporary
examples supporting it would be the situations in Northern Ireland or the
Lebanon. (However, I accept that there are situations where it doesn't hold,
and where I might want to produce other arguments against killing.)
>--Alan Wexelblat
                                      Adrian Kent