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From: afb@pucc-i (Michael Lewis)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: Star Wars, Computers and Doomsday Machines
Message-ID: <1235@pucc-i>
Date: Mon, 6-Jan-86 16:14:41 EST
Article-I.D.: pucc-i.1235
Posted: Mon Jan  6 16:14:41 1986
Date-Received: Tue, 7-Jan-86 20:58:12 EST
References: <343@whuts.UUCP> <7800666@inmet.UUCP> <797@whuxl.UUCP> <1305@ames.UUCP>
Organization: Purdue University Computing Center
Lines: 14
Summary: the value of enemy (Russian) uncertainty in strategic planning


     To a large degree, the Russians would measure the success of any all-out
nuclear attack on the United States not on the totality of damage inflicted
but on the destruction of certain vital strategic targets, such as SAC HQ in
Omaha, or NORAD in Colorado.  The success of their attack would be far from
complete if they failed to get any of these targets.  The value of an ABM
system which was 95% effective would be in greatly reducing the Soviet 
certainty of getting the targets they *must* get in order to ensure "success".

     Thus, the mere existence of a 95% effective ABM system would be enough to
deter a Soviet attack in the first place.  Isn't that the justification for 
having a strategic missile force in the first place?

     Mike Lewis @ Purdue University