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From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: Orphaned Response
Message-ID: <39000047@ISM780B.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 9-Jan-86 14:16:00 EST
Article-I.D.: ISM780B.39000047
Posted: Thu Jan  9 14:16:00 1986
Date-Received: Mon, 13-Jan-86 17:57:56 EST
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Nf-From: ISM780B!jim    Jan  9 14:16:00 1986


>/* Written  4:14 pm  Jan  6, 1986 by afb@pucc-i> in ISM780B:net.politics */
>/* ---------- "Re: Star Wars, Computers and Doomsd" ---------- */
>
>     To a large degree, the Russians would measure the success of any all-out
>nuclear attack on the United States not on the totality of damage inflicted
>but on the destruction of certain vital strategic targets, such as SAC HQ in
>Omaha, or NORAD in Colorado.  The success of their attack would be far from
>complete if they failed to get any of these targets.  The value of an ABM
>system which was 95% effective would be in greatly reducing the Soviet
>certainty of getting the targets they *must* get in order to ensure "success".
>
>     Thus, the mere existence of a 95% effective ABM system would be enough to
>deter a Soviet attack in the first place.  Isn't that the justification for
>having a strategic missile force in the first place?
>
>     Mike Lewis @ Purdue University

The problem is that a design requirement of the proposed system is that
the Soviets do not increase their current number of missiles.
The situation is not static.  If you set out to build a 95% effective system,
when you are done the situation will be that you will have a much less
effective system because your very actions have forced/justified the Soviets
to produce a massive increase in missiles, warheads, dummys, etc.

While destruction of incoming missiles is a very difficult task that is a
great challenge for people working on the design of SDI systems, it turns
out that, once you have built an SDI, there is another target that is easy
to knock down.  Another SDI system.

I suspect that the only viable defense against the Soviets is cultural
assimilation (something made impossible by the attitude of the current
administration toward travel, visas, media exchange, etc.)

-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)