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From: janw@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Individual as a Mythical Beast
Message-ID: <28200505@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 3-Jan-86 20:48:00 EST
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200505
Posted: Fri Jan  3 20:48:00 1986
Date-Received: Sun, 5-Jan-86 20:46:59 EST
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Nf-ID: #N:inmet:28200505:000:3476
Nf-From: inmet!janw    Jan  3 20:48:00 1986


[Larry Kolodney (INTERNET) lkk@mit-mc.arpa]
[criticising Radford Neal's solution for Free Rider problem]
>How many people do you know who are rational?  This is a major flaw in
>libertarian thinking, assuming rational agents.   ...

>The biggest flaw in libertarian thinking is, however, the notion that
>people are independent free agents.  ...
>In practice, it doesn't come close  to  modeling  real  societies
>(except  perhaps  the  "society" of net.land, which might explain
>the high number of libertarians around.)

The assumptions are indeed made, and they are  indeed  less  than
factually  true.  But this does not necessarily make them flawed.
Very similar (perhaps identical) assumptions are needed to justi-
fy  *democracy*.  And  this  led  its critics (e.g., Sorel, Shaw,
Mussolini, Lenin ) to make much the same points and to  proceed
to  denounce  democracy as a sham. According to Lenin, freedom of
the press is a sham because "one cannot live in  society  and  be
free from society". Quite true, too - yet the consistent applica-
tion of this turns out to  yield  much  worse  results  than  the
application of the "flawed" assumptions of a person as a free,
rational, independent agent, of press freedom being possible etc.

The assumptions are not factual. But they  retain  at  least  two
other  kinds  of  value.  First,  as imperfect *idealizations* of
reality. Atoms are not elastic balls,  water  does  not  *really*
consist  of  individual H2-O molecules, yet for many applications
this is good enough. And even when it is not - the time  to  dis-
card  a  model  is when you have a better one (which, to do Lenin
justice, he thought he had). Class model, race  model,  nation  as
super-organism  model - are all alternatives to the rational atom
model - but *are they better* ?

The second value the assumptions have is as a *normative*,  ethi-
cal  principle.  The  Declaration  of Independence says: "We hold
those truths to be self-evident" - and proceeds  to  list  highly
controversial  (at the time) and quite unprovable statements. The
statements were *normative*,  not  descriptive.  The  assumptions
that *ought* to be made.

One defense of these assumptions in this second sense consists in
pointing  out  the  *results*  of  accepting them compared to the
*results* of alternative assumptions.  Assuming  people  are  ra-
tional,  you  give  them  a  chance  to exercise that quality - a
chance many of them botch.  That's tough.

But if you decide to treat them as sheep - their best  chance  to
get  along  in  your society is to *be* sheep. The success of the
first approach *does* depend on the initial level of rationality;
but  if  there  is  enough, it *grows*. The second approach works
only for the *shepherds* who quickly discover the proper  use  of
sheep: fleece them and butcher them.

The problem is not just: are people really rational enough to de-
cide  their  own  destiny?  The  problem  is, also, who is super-
rational and super-benevolent enough to decide it for  them?  And
even *that* would only guarantee a society of happy sheep under a
Good Shepherd. Frankly, I'd prefer a bad shepherd, more chance of
a change.

>(except  perhaps  the  "society" of net.land, which might explain
>the high number of libertarians around.)

A nice conjecture, for all I know it may be true. If all
humankind needs is to become as rational and independent as
the marginal netter, can things be quite hopeless ?

		Jan Wasilewsky