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From: berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman)
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Rent-a-Cop
Message-ID: <1950@psuvax1.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 5-Jan-86 23:59:01 EST
Article-I.D.: psuvax1.1950
Posted: Sun Jan  5 23:59:01 1986
Date-Received: Wed, 8-Jan-86 19:49:59 EST
References: <883@mmintl.UUCP> <28200419@inmet.UUCP> <953@mmintl.UUCP>
Organization: Pennsylvania State Univ.
Lines: 56

> In article <28200419@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes:
> >[Frank Adams ihpn4!philabs!pwa-b!mmintl!franka]
> >>Organized crime is a feudal power structure.  The formula for
> >>computing taxes in a feudal government is (your tax) = (your wealth) minus
> >>(the minimum you need to live on).
> >
> >No, this is not true of feudalism at all. Through the Middle Ages,
> >the amount a serf or a vassal owed his liege was supposed  to  be
> >*fixed* once and for all, from times immemorial. In practice, hu-
> >man memory being short, it changed quite a lot, but it changed by
> >*precedent*,  not through arbitrary imposition. E.g., .........
>
> This was the theory.  The practice was that the amount a serf owed his
>

The practice was more varied than both Franka and janw admit.  There was
no single simple formula for feudal rent.  Basically, there existed three
tendencies:
  a.  feudals wanted to maximize their rent;
  b.  different feudal group fighted for their share;
  c.  rentpayers (or other taxpayers) tried to evade rent.

The third tendency had two possible outlets:
  i.  migration;
  ii. rebelion.
  When the population was relatively sparse (like after Great Plague),
it was relatively easy to move, legally or illegally, to a domain of
more lenient lord.  This lord would increase its rent by increasing
the number of peasants.  In fact, stabilization of rents in monetary
terms was partially a cartel-like response of lords to this situation:
it prevented excesses of downward bidding between lords.

  This tendency was even more important amoung merchants and money-
-lenders.  The richest ones preferred to operate from thosed feudal
domains were the suzerain was in favor of them.  Due to geography
of Western Europe, there was always a "safe haven" for money-people:
Italian city-states, Flanders, etc.

  Rebelion was ultimate responce, invariably expensive for lords.
Thus its treat was valid even if the rebelion itself would be doomed.

  Lastly, there was always a conflict between the Crown and the
"independent" feudals.  The Crown preferred to keep the taxes payable
to the lord small, while increasing the taxes payable to the king.
Lords had reverse preferrence.  Stable feudal rents could mean increase
of the king's share in the global amount of taxes.  This was the
case in so-called absolute monarchies.

  As far as the original question was concerned: the price of police
protection, when mafia=police, the above complications apply.  The
biggest danger is not in the amount of taxes which would be payed,
but in potential escalation of violence (like in Lebanon, or so many
feudal wars).  Conventional police/military is rather expensive, but
at least reliable (in USA, at least).

Piotr Berman