Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: $Revision: 1.6.2.16 $; site inmet.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!zeta!sabre!petrus!bellcore!decvax!cca!inmet!janw From: janw@inmet.UUCP Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Solution to Free Rider problem Message-ID: <28200516@inmet.UUCP> Date: Sun, 5-Jan-86 23:08:00 EST Article-I.D.: inmet.28200516 Posted: Sun Jan 5 23:08:00 1986 Date-Received: Thu, 9-Jan-86 17:46:52 EST References: <20@calgary.UUCP> Lines: 49 Nf-ID: #R:calgary:-2000:inmet:28200516:000:2050 Nf-From: inmet!janw Jan 5 23:08:00 1986 [laura@l5] >As far as I can tell, there are two sorts of free-riders that >some people think should be coerced. >Type A: > This guy really and sincerely believes that the Good Thing is not worth > his money. [ ... ] >Type B: > This guy really and sincerely believes that the Good Thing is worth his > money. But it will get done without him, so why should he bother [...] Valid distinction, but there is a 3d type, probably the most important. Type C: This gal really and sincerely believes that the Good Thing is worth her money. And she is willing to do her share, *provided others do theirs*. But, there being no guarantee, she does not. This is the classical Prisoner's Dilemma - but with two crucial distinctions: (1) There is an exchange of benefits, not of harm. A prisoner cannot incrementally *unsqueal*, once he has squealed. (2) *Communication is possible*. Radford Neal's scheme makes use of these differences. It is a general solution for type C. On popular issues like defense or charity, I believe this category to be the most numerous. It is also *articulate* (as is A) whereas B is typically shy to voice its position. The moral side of the issue (I am appealing to common feeling, not to specifically libertarian sensibilities): Type C deserves something better than to be coerced. The right to coerce the conscientious objector type A is doubtful . That leaves type B - the willing free riders. OK, they are that - on this one issue. They may be contributing more than their share on something else. Radford's scheme simply ignores them, in the hope that some of them may come on board, if they see that it is *not* being done without them; and it lets the rest have a free ride. My guess is that it would work. After all, even the income tax system worked for a long time, with very little enforcement. (Now it is breaking down, with a lot of enforcement). Charities work, too, and collect more and more. And neither of them has the advantages of this scheme. Jan Wasilewsky