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From: janw@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Individual as a Mythical Beast
Message-ID: <28200572@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 10-Jan-86 23:30:00 EST
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200572
Posted: Fri Jan 10 23:30:00 1986
Date-Received: Fri, 24-Jan-86 22:32:46 EST
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Nf-From: inmet!janw    Jan 10 23:30:00 1986


[Gabor Fencsik {ihnp4,dual,lll-crg,hplabs}!qantel!gabor]
>The 'rational actors' assumption may indeed be used to justify democracy
>but I don't think it is one of the stronger arguments for the democratic
>process. The cult of rationality is more likely to lead one to favor the
>rule of philosopher kings or a mandarin class. A decision obtained through
>the democratic process need not be any more rational than decisions by fiat 
>or augury. The democratic process is preferred because (1) through the free
>exchange of ideas it provides short feedback loops permitting incremental
>corrections and adjustments; (2) it cloaks decisions with a (mythical) veil
>of legitimacy so people are willing to accept political authority that is
>not based on religious belief or raw coercion.

There is a lot of truth in it, *but*:
*Every* political system needs a cloak of legitimacy; the difference
is in what kind of cloak. Divine right of kings works fine; when
faith weakens, a cult of the king himself, or a dictator, serves
quite well. Will of the people justifies plebiscitary bonapartism
etc. But for liberal democracy, a necessary assumption is that people
either vote their interest, or public interest and that they
can discern it. This is rationality. More than that, any system
of division of powers assumes people who can negotiate their
differences - and that demands even greater rationality.

The objections that were made at each stage of expanding suffrage
are characteristic : they usually consisted in the assertion that
the group of people in question are insufficiently rational (wom-
en,  blacks), insufficiently informed (uneducated classes) or in-
sufficiently independent (employees). Another objection  would
be  that  though the group in question would vote their interest,
that interest is naturally antagonistic to  that  of  society  at
large  (the  poor  who  supposedly don't have enough stake in the
system). All the above arguments have  in  fact  been  made,  and
though spurious, they illustrate the basic assumption.

The assumption of *independence* is best demonstrated by the
institution of *secret ballot*. An opposite assumption of
*consensus* would call for quite different procedures.

>The democratic process is preferred because (1) through the free
>exchange of ideas it provides short feedback loops permitting incremental
>corrections and adjustments ...

Very true, and it shows that the  rationality  assumption  is  not
*merely*  a useful fiction: free exchange of ideas and experimental
feedback make *democratic process* to  some  limited  degree  a
*rational process*.

Be that as it may, my basic point was *not* that *the  same*  as-
sumptions  made in support of democracy should be made elsewhere.
This, to my argument, was coincidental. Rather it was that *some*
assumptions  about  individual behaviour in society can be rea-
sonably and usefully made without being  true  in  all,  or  even
most, individual cases.

		Jan Wasilewsky