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From: janw@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Laws of Libertaria
Message-ID: <28200587@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 12-Jan-86 20:57:00 EST
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200587
Posted: Sun Jan 12 20:57:00 1986
Date-Received: Fri, 24-Jan-86 22:33:24 EST
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Nf-From: inmet!janw    Jan 12 20:57:00 1986


[Mike Huybensz  ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh]
>> You are quite right that arbitration doesn't work  when  one  of
>> the parties is powerless. This is a point that needed to be made.

>Not generally powerless: powerless with respect to one party at one
>particular time is all that is necessary.  

Sure: but, in an interdependent society, one kind of power at one
place  can  be  negotiated  into another kind of power in another
place. I once wrote a senator about a dissident friend of mine in
Russia,  and  got  a very helpful reply. The point of this is, he
wasn't a senator from *my* state; and certainly not a  senator
from Russia; there are hardly any Soviet immigrants in his state,
too. But being helpful  *may*  help  him  indirectly,  some  day.
This is how it works in democracy, for  which I have two cheers.

>So then how does an aggreived but "powerless" party get satisfac-
>tion in your libertaria?

Two sides should be discerned in this question: the *mechanisms*
of getting satisfaction; and the *motive force* activating
these mechanisms. E.g., in our society, the Congress, the press,
the lobbies etc. are the machinery through which the *interests*
of, say, polluters and anti-polluters work. 

What you need to get satisfaction is a *coalition* of  interests;
and  you need *structure* so that the interests can coalesce. The
*kind* of structure can vary. Libertaria is not  supposed  to  be
structureless. It would have its institutions.

The difference between it and status quo is that no institution
has an artificial *monopoly* on the functions it is supposed
to serve. The advantages are many.  Competition is an incentive
for the institution to *really* serve the supposed function. Thus, even
where de facto there is a monopoly (a natural monopoly)
it works better and is sensitive to customers. 
Old institutions that don't fit new needs (and societal
change is likely to accelerate dramatically, led by technology),
will disappear with little fuss .
Completely new institutions can be invented and implemented
with no permission from anyone.
Where no natural monopoly exists, variety of needs will be
met by variety of institutions.

The monopoly that  existing  structures  of  government  exercise
takes  two  forms: they forcibly *preempt* resourses of society, so
that it cannot afford an alternative  set  of  institutions;  and
they  forcibly  *prevent*  these  institutions from functioning.
Funding of public schools and licencing of teachers are the ex-
amples of these two sides of monopoly.

In justice and police protection, it is much more complete.

Back to your question: seemingly powerless people  get  satisfac-
tion, in democracy *or* Libertaria, by being  members  of  coali-
tions.  *That* is not the difference between the two social orders.
The *mechanisms* the coalitions use *would*  be  different.  They
would be more flexible and diverse.

			Jan Wasilewsky