Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site cybvax0.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!bellcore!decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh From: mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Laws of Libertaria Message-ID: <904@cybvax0.UUCP> Date: Thu, 23-Jan-86 17:15:11 EST Article-I.D.: cybvax0.904 Posted: Thu Jan 23 17:15:11 1986 Date-Received: Sat, 25-Jan-86 09:46:09 EST References: <28200585@inmet.UUCP> <28200587@inmet.UUCP> Reply-To: mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) Organization: Cybermation, Inc., Cambridge, MA Lines: 54 Summary: In article <28200587@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: > > [Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh] > >> You are quite right that arbitration doesn't work when one of > >> the parties is powerless. This is a point that needed to be made. > > >Not generally powerless: powerless with respect to one party at one > >particular time is all that is necessary. > > Sure: but, in an interdependent society, one kind of power at one > place can be negotiated into another kind of power in another > place. I once wrote a senator about a dissident friend of mine in > Russia, and got a very helpful reply. Where was the exercise of power: did anything change in Russia? > The point of this is, he > wasn't a senator from *my* state; and certainly not a senator > from Russia; there are hardly any Soviet immigrants in his state, > too. But being helpful *may* help him indirectly, some day. > This is how it works in democracy, for which I have two cheers. Words are cheap. Power isn't. I'm not real impressed by the negotiation of words at one time for a possible vote later: at least not as an example of negotiating power in one place into power in another. > >So then how does an aggreived but "powerless" party get satisfac- > >tion in your libertaria? > > Two sides should be discerned in this question: the *mechanisms* > of getting satisfaction; and the *motive force* activating > these mechanisms. E.g., in our society, the Congress, the press, > the lobbies etc. are the machinery through which the *interests* > of, say, polluters and anti-polluters work. You also need to consider the efficiency of the machinery for transmitting power. That's a strong point of one government, and a weak point between governments. > The difference between [Libertaria] and status quo is that no institution > has an artificial *monopoly* on the functions it is supposed > to serve. The advantages are many. Competition is an incentive > for the institution to *really* serve the supposed function. Thus, even > where de facto there is a monopoly (a natural monopoly) > it works better and is sensitive to customers. By the definition of a natural monopoly, it is uneconomic for anyone to compete. So why would there be efficiency and responsiveness? For that matter, what do you think is an example of a natural monopoly, and why aren't governments natural monopolies by that standard? -- Mike Huybensz ...decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!cybvax0!mrh