Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!genrad!mit-eddie!think!harvard!caip!lll-crg!ucdavis!ucbvax!space From: Bakin@HI-MULTICS.ARPA (Jerry Bakin) Newsgroups: net.space Subject: Re: A High Tech Maginot Line Message-ID: <851221223119.997886@HI-MULTICS.ARPA> Date: Sat, 21-Dec-85 17:31:00 EST Article-I.D.: HI-MULTI.851221223119.997886 Posted: Sat Dec 21 17:31:00 1985 Date-Received: Fri, 17-Jan-86 04:54:09 EST Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The ARPA Internet Lines: 96 From: ulysses!burl!clyde!watmath!utzoo!henry@ucbvax.berkeley.edu (Henry Spencer) Subject: Re: A High Tech Maginot Line Sender: usenet@ucbvax.berkeley.edu To: space-incoming@s1-b.arpa (In which I open my mouth, a decision I think I already regret). > I've got a better solution. Let's establish a treaty that bans all further > tests of anti-satellite weapons by either side. That'll effectively keep > the Soviets from developing the "space blockade" capability of which you > speak. >> Only if it also bans development of boost-phase missile interception, >> which is much closer to the problem at hand. And only if it is >> completely verifiable, which I fear I have no confidence in. Henry, I think you've missed the point; however, most people do. There are two points to make: A 100% test ban is much more verifiable than any sort of limited treaty of any kind (either limiting test or capabilities). There is always a possibility that any side will violate any treaty, the question becomes how often can they expect to be able to violate it, and get away with it because they weren't caught. This turns into a question about the sensors we might deploy. What kind of accuracy can we expect from our sensors? Are you willing to agree that our sensors would have a 50% chance of catching one test? That means that if any country were to have even two tests of any system, we would have a 75% chance of finding out that they have had even one test. And we would protest, because with a 100% test ban, even one test is a violation. A country that has to use a system that has only been tested once may think twice about it. Are our sensors only thirty percent effective? Than after two tests, we still have a 51% chance of figuring out they have tested a weapon. After three such tests, our chance becomes 65%. One out of three tests are caught. A country might be able to test their system twice (if they are lucky). How accurate are our sensors? I dunno, the air force museum will show you a camera (and an old one at that) that can take pictures of golf balls on greens. I think we can develop sensors which are at least thirty percent effective. Oh you don't think so? Well look at limited bans then, if a sensor which has only to distinguish between existence or not (a 100% ban) is only thirty percent effective, how effective can sensors be which have to discriminate between shades of treaty compliance? A limited treaty is one that relies on faith. Sensors which can verify a limited treaty can of course verify a 100% test ban. A slogan: a 100% test ban is needed because we don't trust the Soviets, not because we do. Should development of boost-phase missile interception be banned? Of course. There is a fundamental difference however, between ASATs and boost-phase missile interceptions: boost-phase missile interceptions (almost by definition) involve firing weapons into the territorial land of the country! From previous discussions in space-digest, the legal issuses of whom owns space seem fuzzy. Shooting a satellite is something that ``could'' be gotten away with. Developing and testing an ASAT system is something which might even be acceptable to another side (although it is foolish of course by any side -- especially ours -- the value of satellites is information -- who will lose most if recon satellites are killed?). Any sort of boost phase interception development program is clearly an offensive weapon. SDI aside, any system which seeks to shoot elementary particles, rocks, VW sized shells, or even propaganda into another country is clearly an offensive weapon. Shore batteries shooting into the ocean are defensive, ASATs might be, the New Jersey is an offensive weapon, boost-phase missile interception (and those aspects of SDI) are too. With that in mind, of course we should ban development of boost-phase missile interception capabilities as well as ASAT capabilities. And since the former is obviously an offensive weapon while the latter is only most assuredly an offensive weapon, we should probably ban the former first. Except that, contrary to your message, ASATS are much closer than boost-phase missile interception weapons. But come on, do you think SDI has been pushed this far only to allow treaties on boost-phase missile interception weapons to be negotiated? Jerry Bakin Replies to this digest only please. Disclaimer: nah, I've spoken to Ed Spencer, Thomas Watson, Alexander Graham Bell, Ken Olsen, R.J. Reynolds, J. Beggs, and H. Packard :). They all agree.