Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!decvax!genrad!panda!talcott!harvard!seismo!hao!nbires!boulder!cisden!john From: john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) Newsgroups: net.abortion Subject: Re: a task ... Nazis, again Message-ID: <450@cisden.UUCP> Date: Wed, 22-Jan-86 16:35:51 EST Article-I.D.: cisden.450 Posted: Wed Jan 22 16:35:51 1986 Date-Received: Sun, 26-Jan-86 23:47:39 EST References: <1100@oddjob.UUCP> <380@cisden.UUCP> <387@cisden.UUCP> <210@aero.ARPA> <420@cisden.UUCP> <219@aero.ARPA> Reply-To: john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) Distribution: na Organization: ConTel Information Systems, Denver Lines: 148 This is in reference to Dave Suess' recent valuable articles arguing against the propriety of referring to Nazis in arguments about abortion, as I did. My feeling is that this discussion is interesting but has gotten a little off the point. I tried with not a lot of success to be brief. In article <218@aero.ARPA> zeus@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) finds fault with my defence of one of my arguments as a _reductio_ad_absurdum_, arguing correctly that what I was doing was not (as I had written) showing a flaw in the logic of the argument I was criticising, but rather showing a flaw in the premises of that argument. He's right, but it's beside the point -- my argument stands even though my analysis of my argument was flawed. The technique of building a parallel argument and deriving an absurdity will work whether the flaw in the original was in logic or in premise. In either case, it's a _reductio_ad_absurdum_; the _res_absurda_ isn't the same though. As Dave writes (and I agree entirely): > The problem is the (hidden) premise that imposing one's morality >on others is a "bad thing." This hidden premise exists in the refutation, as >well, but the conclusion that laws against murder are a bad thing follows >because of the flawed second premise, not because the syllogism has faulty >logic. My reference to Nazis was meant as an illustration of the falsity of the premise (which wasn't all that hidden, after all) that "imposing our morality on other people is always bad". >> Step 2 is my exactly parallel argument >>concluding that killing Jews should not be illegal (conclusion N). We all >>agree that N is false (step 3) -- that's why it's a handy test case. >[...] > "We all agree that N is false" is >also specious, ad populum, etc., since we can find (elsewhere on the net, if >he's still there) neo-nazis today, regrettably. Here I have to disagree with Dave. 1. I didn't say "Our agreement that N is false proves that N is false" -- as he says, that would have been _ad_populum_; although I'm not sure it even has enough appearance of accuracy to call it specious. 2. If we wait to accept something as true until not only all the participants in the discussion accept it as true, but until all possible hypothetical participants can be anticipated to accept it, we'll absolutely *never* get *anywhere*. None of the people in this discussion question my assertion "that killing Jews should not be illegal" is false. If someone who actually thought Jew-killing was okay were participating, I'd debate the point. But nobody is. So why can't we accept it as true and get on to other things? >We don't need Nazis and Jews to refute the premise that "all impositions of >morality are 'bad things'" and to include them is an appeal to emotions or >to pity. It's true. We don't *need* the example. I could have said, simply, "You don't really believe your own premise that imposing morality is always wrong." But it's a whole lot more satisfying to demonstrate that they don't believe the premise by illustrating with a case in which they in fact don't believe it, and will see that they don't. A counterexample to a general assertion is, bar none, the strongest way to dispute it. >A well-known anti-abortion advocate, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, has written: > "As a Jew, I cannot remain silent at this facile use of the > Nazi analogy, though I realize that some anti-abortion Jews > use it. If this argument is so compelling, why do Jews > remain generally favorable toward abortion?" Did you intend this to illustrate the fallacy of _argumentum_ad_populum_? It's a pretty pure example of it, don't you think? In article <219@aero.ARPA> zeus@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) writes, quoting me: >>The main reason for referring to Nazis in a rational discussion of abortion >>is this, that they believed that killing innocent people in some instances >>was morally okay, but that all civilized people (and everyone in this >>discussion) agree that they were murderers, i.e. that their morality was >>*wrong*. (I'll cheerfully use some other example if you suggest a similar >>one.) > >1. I think Nazis did *not* believe in killing innocent people; rather, their >ignoble morality classified Jews as non-innocent, non-people. But this makes the parallel even more exact. My opponents in the abortion debate don't believe they're advocating the killing of innocent people either. I think they are, just as we all think the Nazis were. And again, the whole point was that in such a case, *even the opponents* agree that there's nothing inherently wrong with the guy who thinks it *is* murder using force or law to stop the guy who thinks it *isn't*. I ask again, can you think of a better real-life case to use as a parallel, where group A thought that killing a member of group C was okay, and group B thought the same act was murder? >2. "all civilized people" sounds suspiciously ad populum, and to say that >the Nazis' morality was "wrong" begs the question of right and wrong in the >context of moral systems. I answered this earlier. And I have no qualms at all about asserting Nazi morality to be wrong. You called it "ignoble" yourself. What's the point? >3. As I have pointed out elsewhere, the "rational" (say, non-emotional) >refutation of the original argument (that since anti-abortion laws impose >one's morality on others, so anti-abortion laws are a "bad thing") does >NOT require an example with Nazis and Jews, it merely requires a counter- >example that refutes the hidden premise (all impositions of one's morality >on others are a "bad thing"). So, another example is NOT needed. If a >*rational* argument is to be pursued, one can use the *general* case of >murder, and leave out an example that has historically been used to >evoke emotional responses. The "*general* case of murder" doesn't work, because it can be easily, and fairly sensibly, argued that most murderers don't really think what they do is right. The Nazis really seem to have thought they were doing good by slaughtering people, though. You need a specific example where someone thought it was permissible to kill. > I claim that using Nazis and Jews is an argument by >analogy and an appeal to emotions: Nazis and Jews are *not* required to >refute the original argument. An argument by analogy would have said 1. Foetuses and Jews are similar (in some relevant way). 2. It is wrong to kill Jews. 3. Therefore it is wrong to kill foetuses. I didn't do anything like that at all! >>So in article <210@aero.ARPA> zeus@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) has apparently >>misunderstood what I was getting at. He writes, at first quoting me: > >Now we're getting somewhere. THIS looks like argumentum_ad_hominem (abusive). Look up _ad_hominem_. Saying that *apparently* somebody misunderstood something has *nothing* in common with _argumentum_ad_hominem_, and can only be classed as abusive by grossly indulging your sensitivity to insult. I didn't abuse; I tried to correct what I thought was a failure on your part to grasp what I meant. If I'm wrong, I'm sorry. But _ad_hominem_? >Almost finally, it is easy for you to assert that my statement about the >Nazis' stand on abortion is false, but I have evidence to the contrary. I'll get back to you on this. -- Peace and Good!, Fr. John Woolley "Compared to what I have seen, all that I have written is straw." -- St. Thomas