Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site aero.ARPA Path: utzoo!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest!sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!trwrb!trwrba!aero!zeus From: zeus@aero.ARPA (Dave Suess) Newsgroups: net.abortion Subject: Re: a task ... Nazis, again Message-ID: <235@aero.ARPA> Date: Tue, 28-Jan-86 02:55:21 EST Article-I.D.: aero.235 Posted: Tue Jan 28 02:55:21 1986 Date-Received: Thu, 30-Jan-86 02:02:10 EST References: <1100@oddjob.UUCP> <380@cisden.UUCP> <387@cisden.UUCP> <210@aero.ARPA> <420@cisden.UUCP> <219@aero.ARPA> <450@cisden.UUCP> Reply-To: zeus@aero.UUCP (Dave Suess) Distribution: na Organization: The Aerospace Corporation, El Segundo, CA Lines: 105 Keywords: Nazis; specious arguments Summary: final plea to avoid emotional examples in rational argument In article <450@cisden.UUCP> john@cisden.UUCP (John Woolley) writes: >... As Dave writes (and I agree entirely): >> The problem is the (hidden) premise that imposing one's morality >>on others is a "bad thing." This hidden premise exists in the refutation, as >>well, but the conclusion that laws against murder are a bad thing follows >>because of the flawed second premise, not because the syllogism has faulty >>logic. > >My reference to Nazis was meant as an illustration of the falsity of the >premise (which wasn't all that hidden, after all) that "imposing our >morality on other people is always bad". And my complaint remains: using the Nazis tugs at the emotions in what otherwise purports to be a rational discussion. "Nazis" certainly aren't needed to illustrate that the premise doesn't hold. > ... >>We don't need Nazis and Jews to refute the premise that "all impositions of >>morality are 'bad things'" and to include them is an appeal to emotions or >>to pity. > >It's true. We don't *need* the example. I could have said, simply, "You >don't really believe your own premise that imposing morality is always >wrong." But it's a whole lot more satisfying to demonstrate that they don't >believe the premise by illustrating with a case in which they in fact don't >believe it, and will see that they don't. > >A counterexample to a general assertion is, bar none, the strongest way >to dispute it. Again, my point: since the example you chose wasn't *needed*, why lay an argument open to the claim that since it uses an emotion-charged example rather than bland hypotheticals, the argument has no validity in a rational discussion? Or the claim that the example was chosen to deliberately manipulate the emotions in the way that the presenter of the argument wants them manipulated? I agree that a counterexample is a strong tactic; but why not use words like "A society that holds that some people, because of their genetic backgrounds, are inferior and may be executed at will" instead of "Nazis and Jews"? >>A well-known anti-abortion advocate, Dr. Bernard Nathanson, has written: >>... >Did you intend this to illustrate the fallacy of _argumentum_ad_populum_? >It's a pretty pure example of it, don't you think? > Oops. Mea maxima culpa. (Perhaps I meant it as a snappy yet apropos quote to end that posting, to jazz up my empty signature space. Perhaps I was anxious to show that I'm not the first to point out that references to Nazis in abortion arguments are specious, or that it is not a point made just by anti-anti-abortionists. Probably I screwed up, especially if it distracted from the legitimate points I was trying to make.) >... I ask again, can >you think of a better real-life case to use as a parallel, where group A >thought that killing a member of group C was okay, and group B thought the >same act was murder? > But why is it necessary to use a "real-life" case? To appeal to the emotions? I find it hard to justify any other answer. Anyway, it doesn't take much imagination to come up with more examples that are not the typical "Nazis" analogy. Try Charlie Manson and Family for group A, the Tates and LaBiancas (or any affluent "pigs") for group C, and the state of California for group B. Or try considering group C as the current inhabitants of Death Rows in the US, group A as the citizens of the US, and group B as a shocked group of foreign anti-capital-punishment activists. Or try group C as the people of Jericho (Rahab and her house excepted), group B as their neighbors in Ai and other Canaanites, and group A as Joshua and the tribes of Israel! Emotions abound for manipulation in that bunch of examples, but I thought this was *rational* discussion. > ... >> I claim that using Nazis and Jews is an argument by >>analogy and an appeal to emotions: Nazis and Jews are *not* required to >>refute the original argument. > >An argument by analogy would have said > 1. Foetuses and Jews are similar (in some relevant way). > 2. It is wrong to kill Jews. > 3. Therefore it is wrong to kill foetuses. >I didn't do anything like that at all! True; but what *I* would have put for the aforementioned argument by analogy would be 1. Nazis thought it was okay to kill Jews. 2. Pro-abortion people think it is okay to kill foetuses. 3. Foetuses and Jews are similar (they are both unfairly killed) 4. Nazis and pro-abortion people are similar (they both have philosophies that justify unfair killings). 5. Everybody knows Nazis were damned wrong, so ... 6. Everybody should know the pro-choice position is damned wrong. Please note that this is *not* what you wrote (ever); it is what *can be* inferred from using the "Nazis" example, with little difficulty. Your analogy (please notice) left out the Nazis, and could have *easily* left out the Jews (and substituted "adults" or "birthed people"). Emotions get evoked: one camp can be self-righteously stroked, while another camp can get irritated that their arguments are being dragged through unnecessary mud. My final comment on the subject: if an argument is so weak that it depends on emotional responses, then it is better left out of a purported rational discussion and reserved for rabble-rousing. Otherwise, its inclusion in rational debate appears contrived, inappropriate, and the mark of a losing argument. Dave Suess zeus@aero2.arpa