Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: Notesfiles $Revision: 1.7.0.10 $; site uokvax.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ihnp4!inuxc!pur-ee!uiucdcs!okstate.UUCP!uokvax.UUCP!cdrigney From: cdrigney@uokvax.UUCP Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Orphaned Response Message-ID: <5000169@uokvax.UUCP> Date: Wed, 5-Feb-86 20:25:00 EST Article-I.D.: uokvax.5000169 Posted: Wed Feb 5 20:25:00 1986 Date-Received: Mon, 10-Feb-86 22:06:43 EST References: <915@whuxl.UUCP> Lines: 204 Nf-ID: #R:whuxl.UUCP:915:uokvax.UUCP:5000169:000:9741 Nf-From: uokvax.UUCP!cdrigney Feb 5 19:25:00 1986 /* Written 8:41 am Jan 28, 1986 by orb@whuts.UUCP in uokvax.UUCP:net.politics */ At last, a subject I can sink my teeth into! This is long, but I wanted to give worthwhile answers. There's a short bibliography at the end, for people who'd like to know more. > Here are some important facts on the conventional arms balance in > Europe, from the book, Arsenal of Democracy by Tom Gervasi: > > 1)NATO spending exceeded Warsaw Pact spending each year through the 1970's > ending in 1979 with $212 billion for NATO vs $175 billion for the Warsaw Pact > Secretary of Defense Harold Brown estimated that during the 70's NATO > outspent the Warsaw Pact by $318 billion These comparisons are meaningless unless you carefully study how they're arrived at, and usually meaningless even then. For example, are these counting the salary of Soviet military personnel as what they're actually paid, or what the equivalent U.S. soldier is paid? And do you use the official exchange rate for rubles, the unofficial rate, or some strange weighted figure arrived at by extensive calculations? Dollars and rubles don't fight wars, men and machines do. Comparing dollar figures is useless. > 2)NATO holds the preponderance of naval force with 485 surface combatants > on station vs the Warsaw Pact's 195 If you don't count submarines, this figure is worthless. And counting up all types of ships, without taking into account the type and quality of the ship IN RELATION TO THE MISSION THEY PERFORM is utter nonsense. One might think Nato would be better building 100 Fast Attack Boats instead of one carrier, just because it gives them 100 times as many ships (err, actually I'd think it would be better, but NOT because it gives them more ships for the beancount). > 3)NATO has only 64 active divisions vs 68 Warsaw Pact active divisions: Again, meaningless bean-counting unless you consider the makeup and armament of the divisions. As well, are you familiar with the Russian organization of "invisible" divisions, which hides the command and control structure of two divisions in one? That's why the Germans in WW II organized their plans to defeat 160 Soviet divisions, and found to their dismay after destroying over 300 divisions that there were still plenty. For an excellent look at this, read Suvorov's _Inside the Soviet Army_. > however NATO has a standing force of 2,800,000 vs the Pact's 2,600,000 NATO has a *much* higher "supply tail" than the Warsaw Pact; that is, their supply & logistics uses a much higher fraction of their manpower. Soviet Doctrine is that the only need for resupply is ammunition and fuel (thus their desire for a Russia-Europe pipeline, a whole 'nother topic). > 4)NATO also has a preponderance of reserve strength. Adding active and > reserve forces NATO has 5,184,500 vs 4,800,000 men If you're going to talk about reserves (and you certainly should), what you must look at is mobilization curves - how long does it take NATO to get those 5 million into action, vs. how long does it take the WP to get its 5 million? A definite worry in planning is that for the first 2 weeks or so after mobilization you get a trickle, so if you wait 2 weeks while the other side's mobilizing, you take the chance they will be mostly mobilized when you're just beginning. But if you mobilize when you're not sure the other side is, the economic and political costs are huge, and you take the risk that the other side will get nervous about your mobilization and start to mobilize for real, even if they weren't before. This was a major factor in starting WW I, when mobilization times were measured in months, not weeks. (Note: Starting, not Causing) I don't think I agree with those figures, but that's beside the point. > 5)The above troop figures do *not* include an additional 326,800 French > troops As long as you clearly mention it, no problem. In practice, its very unlikely France would refuse to aid NATO, but that can be reasonably differed on. > Now to consider every militarists' favorite, the infamous "tank > comparison". As I have previously pointed out to myopically > focus solely upon the major weapon of the *last* war is to live > in the past. The tank balance is 27,200 Warsaw Pact tanks to > 11,800 NATO tanks. Tom Gervasi points out that if tanks were > really so critically short in NATO that it would be stupid for > the US to have provided 1,015 M-60A3 tanks and 771 M-48A5 tanks > to various countries in the Middle East and Asia. Similarly if > the British military truly thought tanks were critically needed > in Europe they would be foolish to have planned to send 800 > Chieftain tanks to Iran before the Iranian revolution led to > cancellation. I have great difficulty in believing the "It would be stupid for X to do Y if Z is true, so if X did Y then Z must not be true. It ignores the other possibility, that X is stupid (or, more kindly, mispercieves the situation). Furthermore, Europe is not the beginning and ending of U.S. and U.K. foreign interests - it's important, but so is the Middle East. So I don't find Tom Gervasi's argument persuasive. You have to consider not just numbers of tanks, but quality, and how they relate to doctrine and the use of anti-tank weapons, as well as artillery. Tests that say (I'm just making this up for an example) "An M-1 can destroy 3 T-72s, so it doesn't matter that the Soviets outnumber us 3 to 1." are of little value, especially if they don't take into account whether the M-1 has broken down or not (every 30 miles or so). The rate of production of tanks is also very important, because they get used up at a tremendous pace in the high-pressure crucible of modern warfare. In the few days of the 1973 Arab- Israeli war, 3 years production of tanks were destroyed. Further, you have to take into account doctrine. If you have 10,000 tanks and the enemy has 20,000, each of your tanks doesn't have to defend against 2 of the enemy's! He (ESPECIALLY where he == the Soviets) is going to concentrate his forces, so you may have 1000 tanks defending against 10,000. And with the silly Defense in Depth required by West German refusal to give up any more territory than they absolutely have to and the closeness of the Rhine preventing maneuver, the attacking forces have a tremendous advantage in concentrating forces. If Nato is unwilling to use nuclear weapons, then this advantage is accentuated. But I won't get into *that* subject here. > My previous figures for NATO antitank weapons was incorrect, the correct > figure is 193,000 antitank weapons for NATO vs 68,000 for the Warsaw Pact. What's being counted as an Anti-Tank weapon? Are you including automatic mortars in direct-fire mode, or just RPGs? Also note that the Soviets believe that the anti-Tank weapon is another tank. > NATO's antitank weapons employ the latest in precision guided > technology and electronics including laser, optical and > infrared guidance. Sophisticated weapons are real neat and all, but is a weapon that has an 80% kill ratio that costs 100 times as much as one that has a 10% kill ratio really a bargain? (Again, numbers are purely for illustrative purposes, I'm not arguing these are the exact figures.) > We have seen how deceptive mere quantitative comparisons can be > in the numerous Middle East wars. Time after time Israel's > highly advanced weapons largely from the US, have massacred > Arab Soviet-supplied weapons. This has been true even in cases > of a *quantitative* superiority for the Arabs. I tend to believe that the Israeli victories are more due to the superiority of Israeli tactics and training than their equipment, PLUS the suitability of the areas fought over for Armored warfare. And fighting a defensive battle for survival does wonders for morale. > To say there is a "conventional weapons gap" in NATO is as > absurd as saying the US is behind in the nuclear arms race. To say anything based on nothing but bean-counting is absurd, period. I don't particularly believe there's a gap between NATO and WP wide enough to be threatening, but I can see trends that might lead to that. Anyone interested in a better look at this topic than I've superficially sketched out should take a look at: _The Threat_ by Andrew Cockburn _Inside the Soviet Army_ by Victor Suvurov, an officer who defected from the Soviet Army. _Strategy_ by B.H. Liddell Hart, practically the textbook of the German and Israeli armies. This may be out of print, but its well worth tracking down. Anything else by Hart is liable to be good, for example his _History of the Second World War_, if you're interested in not only *what* happened militarily but *why*. The first is available in paperback, and is quite readable and informative. I don't know if the second is available in paperback, and the first part deals with Soviet Order of Battle in more detail than a casual reader might enjoy, but it's *very* informative. And the latter half presents a view of the Soviet army from someone who's actually been in it, and knows what he's talking about. While not directly linked to this, _Mig Pilot_, I believe by John Barron, presents an interesting look at the "elite" Soviet Air Defense forces (What do Soviet pilots like best about the Mig 25? It uses massive quantities of Alcohol for de-icer, so its airbases have huge quantities of alcohol around and you can get totally smashed with little effort.) Barron's books on the KGB are also excellent, but that's a whole other topic. I invite others to present lists of books on this topic they've found useful. --Carl Rigney USENET: {ihnp4,allegra!cbosgd}!okstate!uokvax!cdrigney