Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site psuvax1.UUCP
Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!bellcore!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest!sdcsvax!sdcrdcf!burdvax!psuvax1!berman
From: berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: Hannibal/history/horsefeathers/Hitler
Message-ID: <1998@psuvax1.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 11-Feb-86 14:42:11 EST
Article-I.D.: psuvax1.1998
Posted: Tue Feb 11 14:42:11 1986
Date-Received: Fri, 14-Feb-86 00:51:50 EST
References: <190@mit-vax.UUCP>
Organization: Pennsylvania State Univ.
Lines: 88

> >>	That concern leads many israeli leaders to adopt the
> >>	axiom "The best defense is the attack or offense". ...
> >>	...
> >>	History teaches that many nations and leaders got trapped in that
> >>	axiom whenever they adopted it. Eventually, it caused their downfall.
> >>	From a politico-military point of view, Hanibal, Neron, Hitler ...
> 					[Chedley Aouriri]
> 		     ------------------------------
>     I perceive that lumping of historical figures as proof  by  mishmash
> coupled with "proof" of some unrelated premise.  [I'll exclude Neron cuz
> I dunno who he was.]
> 
Nero was a Roman emperor, famous of his antiques (feeding lions with
Chrictians, for example).  Not involved in any major war personally.

>     Of Hannibal and Hitler, the claim (that best defense = attack) could
> only  apply to Hitler.  (I'm not sure it does.)  Hannibal's strategy was
> to threaten his enemy's link between resources and home base, then force
> a  battle  of  his choosing.  He first attacked Rome by cutting its link
> with  Spain  (source  of  metals),  forcing  the  Romans  to   send   an
> expeditionary  force  after him, then defeating that force.  

This is not true.  Spain was conquered by Hannibal's father.
There Karthagina exploited large wealth in the silver mines.
Rome at this time had no teritories outside Italy, Sicyly and
Sardinia.

> In crossing
> the Alps and Appenines, he  cut  Rome's  land  lines  with  its  eastern
> empire,  again  forcing  his  opponent  to  attack.  He then sacked Rome
> itself, obligating the Romans to attack again from southern Italy,  once
> more at his schedule, on his choice of turf.  What a smart fellow!

Again, no eastern empire of Rome was in existence at this moment, 
although it was quick to come.  The point was that Roman naval superiority
was complete, so Hannibal could attack only on land.  He recruited large
number of barbarians from Gaul plus some Italian opponents of Roman rule.
For many years he was trying to destroy the core of Roman state, but
to no avail, in spite of spectacular field victories.  Barbaric army
of Hannibal was unable to capture fortified cities.

>     The reason he lost was  that  Scipio  Africanus  proved  too  apt  a
> student:   He sat at Canae, between Carthage and its port - suddenly the
> tables were turned and Hannibal had to restore his  capital's  viability
> by attacking where the Romans had cased the joint and set up shop.  That
> was the end of him, and of Carthage.  [Liddell-Hart,  Sir  Henry  Basil;
> STRATEGY: THE INDIRECT APPROACH].
> 
This is again a mistatement: Carthage was a port, and Canea is a place
in Italy, where Hannibal massacred a Roman army larger than its own.
The reason that he lost was more profound:  Roman state had much greater
resources, large pool of recruits and complete naval superiority.
After ten years of field defeats they assimilated the Hannibal field
tactics and then Hannibal had no trump cards left.

To rebut Aouriri one should rather point that Rome was attacking much
more frequently than Carthage, and it worked for many centuries.

>     Mr.   Aouriri  may  come closer to truth on the Hitler analysis, but
> such a simpleminded assignation of causes  ignores  many  dimensions  of
> Hitler's  mania,  as  well  as  the rest of the world.  In any case, the
> "similarities" between Hitler and Israeli  is  AT  BEST  farfetched.   A
> trivial  counterexample  -  Israel's  failure  to  "attack"  in  time to
> forestall the 1973 Yom Kippur war.
> 
Again, you missed the greates deficiency in this example of Aouriri:
for Hitler the attack was not a method of defence, but of conquest.
For example, would Israel try to emulate his example, she would try
to conquer the Arab lands "from Nile to Euphrates", and the results
would have to be similar.  

>     Your best proof methodology, Mr. Aouriri?  I am underwhelmed.  (Then
> again, at least you're consistent.)
> 
> Oded Feingold     MIT AI Lab.   545 Tech Square    Cambridge, Mass. 02139
> 			        ----------
Both Feingold and Aouriri are seriously undereducated in history.
Aouriry should rather point to Crusader's conquest of Palestine and
Lebanon.  As long as Arabs were split into a multitude of small states,
the Crusaders managed pretty well.  Once Salah-ed-Din unified Egypt and
Syria, they were doomed.  One may imagine that in 50 years Israel's
position may weaken dangerously.  But this assumes that after 50 years
Arabs will be attracted to a militaristic nationalist trying to emulate
Salah-ed-Din.  Regionalism seems to be a much more persistent tradition
for Arabs than "Arab unity" though, and modernization may have requirements
to the contrary of militarization (like open, democratic society).  

Piotr Berman