Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83 based; site hound.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxt!houxm!hound!rwsh From: rwsh@hound.UUCP (R.STUBBLEFIELD) Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Proof That Reason And Force Are Opposites Message-ID: <1626@hound.UUCP> Date: Sun, 26-Jan-86 22:42:37 EST Article-I.D.: hound.1626 Posted: Sun Jan 26 22:42:37 1986 Date-Received: Thu, 6-Feb-86 10:17:54 EST Organization: AT&T Bell Labs, Holmdel NJ Lines: 247 Anatomy of a Socialist's Defense of Force I have mixed emotions about Tim Sevener's response to my essay showing that reason is the opposite of force. On the one hand, it's nice to know that someone took the time to read it and reply; but on the other hand, it is not pleasant to sort out irrelevant insults from substantive objections. The hostile tone he exhibited in his note is not conducive to intellectual discourse and is uncalled for in a public discussion. Although he deserves no reply, I feel compelled to correct the misstatements in his response. "Mr. Stubblefield has certainly presented an elaborate opus of the foundations of his moral philosophy." The whole point of my essay was not a moral point but a factual one: that the aspects of reality identified by the concepts of reason and force (in the aspect of reality where those two concepts are commensurate--social interaction) are opposites. It was not until I reread his response that I associated condescension with his use of "Mr." and "certainly." But "elaborate opus" is a rather obvious term of derision for a 213-line article. [I refer any reader interested in the foundations of an objective moral philosophy to a 110-page essay on a theory of concepts in *Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology* and a 21-page essay in *The Virtue of Selfishness*-- both by Ayn Rand. Both books should be available in most libraries and bookstores. They can also be ordered from Palo Alto Book Service, 200 California Ave, Palo Alto, CA 94306 (415) 327-7781 or Second Renaissance Book Service, 8608 Old Dominion Court, Indianapolis, Ind 46251 (317) 243-8048.] "He and other Libertarians would certainly be enlightened by a study of philosophy, economics and society beyond the narrow circle of Ayn Rand and her cohorts." This statement is insulting on at least five counts. 1. I am not a Libertarian. I care too much for the precision of language to want anyone to identify me as such. [Libertarianism is anti-philosophical. In terms of fundamentals, Libertarianism has much more in common with socialism than it does with my political views-- capitalism. Why this is so would be yet another "elaborate opus." I refer anyone who cannot wait until I get around to giving my explanation to "Libertarianism: The Perversion of Liberty," by Peter Schwartz, now available as a 64-page pamphlet for $4.95 from The Intellectual Activist, 131 Fifth Avenue, Suite 101, New York, NY 10003.] 2. The implication that I am not widely read is irrelevant and false. His easy assertion of a statement so obviously false to anyone who knows me makes me wonder how much he values his own credibility. 3. Someone who associates Ayn Rand with Libertarians is either trying to smear her or has little understanding of either. Someone who speaks down to others for not being widely read should demonstrate having some understanding of those people he implies he has read. 4. There is an implication that Ayn Rand's knowledge of philosophy, economics, and society was narrow. He has as much justification for this claim as his claim about me. Since Rand's books have sold tens of millions, my estimate of the value he places on his own credibility approaches zero. (Does he want only the gullible to read him a second time?) 5. His use of the term "cohorts" is consistent with his insulting tone and message. "Mr. Stubblefield makes a number of basic confusions which were pointed out by other philosophers a long time ago." This generalization would not bother me if it were backed up by concretes. If he were able to clarify my confusions (without insults and misrepresen- tations), I would be quite happy to read his comments. "For one thing his whole *moral* philosophy (and Ayn Rand's) is based on a number of assumptions which make no sense in reality." Except for the fact that my essay did not present any of my moral philosophy (nor Ayn Rand's--nor any way for him to tell if these are the same or different) and except for the fact that the validity of neither my essay nor Ayn Rand's philosophy is based on assumptions, this last sentence holds out hope that discussion is possible. It implies that a standard of agreement is that things should make "sense in reality." I am for reason and reality. If he were too, we could communicate. "The deification of Individualistic `Reason' is merely a variation of Hegel's grand theories of Zeitgeist and the progress of the Ideal in history with which Hegel made such grand apologies for the social order of aristocratic rule by the few in his own day." Any hope for a common base for discussion was false. What is "Individualistic `reason'" and how does it differ from reason as the faculty that identifies and integrates sensory material? If the charge is that I think reason is a faculty of an individual human consciousness, I confess that I cannot see any evidence in reality for an alternative view. And what does it mean to deify reason? If the charge is that my reason is my highest value, that is true--but irrelevant to the question of fact about reason and force. His charge does lead me to wonder what values he places above his own means of being in contact with reality. The association of my (or Ayn Rand's) views with those of Hegel is a monumental distortion. To name the most fundamental difference, I believe in an objective reality, the existence of which is not dependent on consciousness--neither mine, society's, nor God's. Hegel is one of the most explicit advocates of the primacy of consciousness--incidentally, of the collectivist variety. "Marx said then that he would `turn Hegel on his head' and he did." This statement implies that there is a vast difference in the the ideas of Marx and Hegel. It is true that they took opposite sides of a false alternative. (Hegel's Idealism dispenses with existence and Marx's economic determinism dispenses with consciousness.) But what is the difference in practice of the totalitarian state of the Hegelians (Nazi Germany) and the totalitarian states of the Marxists? "Let us now see how we can do so for this argument. Very late in his elaborate exposition Mr. Stubblefield admits: > All the aspects of reason discussed thus far apply in society or > in a desert island environment--i.e., for a single human in isolation. In the first place we must recognize that `reason' is not some dis- embodied innate ability but something culturally learned and intimately connected with language. We have no evidence whatsoever that an infant left on a desert island will learn language - indeed it will not survive at all without human care." There is a confusion here in the mind of the one who wanted to straighten out my "confusions." In particular he confuses the process of reason with results of reason. Reason is the process that an individual human mind must carry out to maintain its contact with reality. Language is a particular creation of acts of reason by many individuals over generations. It is reason that makes language possible--not the other way around. The fact that my powers of reason can be greatly expanded by using concepts others teach me says that society is valuable to me; but society does not do my reasoning for me. "Moreover as Piaget has shown even learning such elementary principles as conservation of mass requires activity *within* the world." The misleading and insulting implication is that I believe otherwise. "This was what Marx meant when he spoke of `turning Hegel on his head.' Not to speak of some abstract supernatural `Reason' independent of our material and social existence but to realize that ideology itself is transmitted through physical means - the electrons on this terminal for example, printing in books, vocal expression,etc." I disagree with Hegel, who thought existence was unreal, and Marx, who thought consciousness was irrelevant. There was nothing in my essay to justify the insulting implication that I think reason is supernatural. "Even our most basic perception, sight, is to some extent *learned* - people who have been blind and suddenly gain their sight must learn how to focus, how to distinguish objects, etc. Piaget's studies show how children must physically interact with the world to learn the most reasonable physical principles." I don't know which of my formulations could have given anyone the false impression that I think people gain knowledge passively or are born with it. I am offended by someone who misrepresents an article by me as holding views I disagree with. "Vygotsky's studies in `Mind and Society' go further and show how conceptual thinking is intimately connected with language via `inner speech.' And that such `inner speech' is socially learned. ... So `reason' itself is no socially isolated absolute." Since I believe words are used in reasoning and most words someone uses are learned from others, what is it that he objects to? I think an individual on a desert island must and can use reason. The only principle I can see consistent with Sevener's views is that reason is an attribute of society and would be impossible for an isolated individual. If he believes that people cannot think except in the society of others, he should state that as a principle and check it out by applying to himself. "But this same problem plagues another part of Mr. Stubblefield's argument when he says: >Reason is the only process of consciousness that produces abstractions > consistent with reality. To do this, it must meet two essential > criteria. First, to qualify as reasoning, a process must deal in > abstractions ultimately based on the evidence of the senses. Second, > it must integrate new conclusions non-contradictorily with all > previous knowledge of the reasoner. Does scientific knowledge really depend upon my own personal evidence of the senses?" The formulation of this question is vague. Why does he introduce the adjective "scientific" when the issue is how does one know anything at all? Does the question imply that scientific knowledge exists in society apart from its existence in the minds of individuals in the society? The examples he uses seem to mean that the actual question in his mind is: "Does everything I know depend on evidence from my own senses?" "Of course not, it cannot be so dependent or else we would spend all our lives trying to discover *anything*. I have never seen Betelguese and yet I have every confidence that it is there. I have never seen the Galapagos turtles or finches with my own eyes and yet I believe they are there as well as the mountains of evidence supporting the theory of evolution. I have gained this `knowledge' not directly through my own senses, for that would be impossible, but through the reports of others in books, articles, etc. In other words through *social communication* and through trust that others will accurately report what they have seen, heard, or perceived. Again, then we find that even scientific knowledge, which strives to be as objective as possible, is still based upon social interaction." I stated an epistemological principle that knowledge starts with sensory evidence. He gives some examples where I agree that people can learn some identifications of reality from others. The epistemological issues involved in what your individual mind needs in order to classify something someone else tells you as knowledge are complex. Before you can know what to believe on indirect evidence, you should grasp how to form conceptual knowledge from direct sensory evidence. But Sevener jumps to a conclusion that is ridiculous when stated as a principle: the base of knowledge is what others tell you. How do you know what they tell you is true? Which others do you believe? Instead of basing what he claims as knowledge on reason and reality, such a mentality will take the word of whoever's ideas he feels are right. "If reason and scientific knowledge cannot be divorced from social interaction then *how* can the problems of ethics?" Ethics gives a guide for human action. There is an implicit premise in this question that a man on a desert island needs no guide for his actions. "this will be continued later ....... tim sevener whuxn!orb" Notice that Sevener's opposition to my proof that force and reason are opposites reduces to the notion that reason is an attribute of a collective rather than of the individual. Your guess is as good as mine as to whether this is done out of respect for reason or from a desire to have force used to get his way. What kind of political system is consistent with reason? One that initiates force against individuals to accomplish what those in power deem to be for the "good of society"--i.e., collectivism? Or one that protects individual rights by preventing members of society from initiating force--i.e., capitalism? -- Bob Stubblefield ihnp4!hound!rwsh 201-949-2846