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From: janw@inmet.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Pollution
Message-ID: <28200611@inmet.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 28-Jan-86 15:24:00 EST
Article-I.D.: inmet.28200611
Posted: Tue Jan 28 15:24:00 1986
Date-Received: Thu, 6-Feb-86 10:50:21 EST
References: <421@umich.UUCP>
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Nf-ID: #R:umich:-42100:inmet:28200611:000:3055
Nf-From: inmet!janw    Jan 28 15:24:00 1986


[--Paul V. Torek       torek@umich]
>Do janw et. al. accept my assessment of janw's scheme for dealing with
>pollution?  Or have they not seen my latest reply on the subject (about 2
>weeks ago)?

There was a hiatus in communication. I am reposting, below, my response to
the last items I saw.

>By the way, I'll try to get around to my critique of Nozick on this subject
>soon.  Then you'll have to defend Nozick, or come up with something better.

I'm looking forward to it. Arguing with you is a pleasure. Let's disagree,
always :-).

[flink@umcp-cs]
>ONE of those individuals is the (would-be) polluter and the other is the 
>(would-be) victim, and if a person has a RIGHT -- a "moral trump card", a
>la most libertarianisms I know of -- not to be imposed upon without consent,
>then the polluter must compensate the victim according to the victim's
>opinion of the worth of his own life, PERIOD, and tough toenails for the
>would-be polluter.

If the right is all on *one* side and if the violation is in  the
*future*  ("would-be  polluter")  then  you are absolutely right.
Both conditions are necessary.
E.g., if I propose to buy your  car  and  you  refuse,  no  court
should  be  able  to appoint a price at which you *have* to sell.
Thus, eminent domain is morally unjustifiable.
Now suppose I smashed your car in an accident. Compensation  will
*not*  be  determined  by  you  unilaterally  (e.g.,  a pound of
flesh). I am wrong, but I still have my rights.

Now consider two people breathing in a stuffy  room.  *Both*  are
polluters,  both  victims  and  by the same process. None holds a
moral trump card. If, for whatever reason (say,  a garlic  diet),
one  pollutes  *more*,  there  is  still  no trump card - it is a
matter of degree; he has a right to breath;  finite  compensation
is appropriate.

"A right not to be imposed upon" is ambiguous.
You interpret it as "right not to be harmed or inconvenienced".
By your definition, if the *existence* of someone gets on
my nerves and shortens my life, that person owes me whatever
I ask (such as to terminate his existence). And for some
reason you consider this bizarre position libertarian.

On this net you have a considerable collection  of  libertarians,
no  two  of  which agree on everything. I'll bet you that not one
accepts the above position. You have *not* to my knowledge  logi-
cally  deduced it from any clearly formulated principle they *do*
recognize.

>>>>[T. Dave Hudson:] But in legal matters, it is sometimes necessary
>>>>to  assign  a value to something. (Unfortunately, this is abused,
>>>>as in taxation and eminent domain.)

>>>Or as in janw's scheme.  No?  Why is it that libertarians forget their
>>>libertarianism at the most convenient moments?

No. See above. Pollution is morally superior to confiscation. 
It is fair for the garlic eater to compensate his roommate;
it is not fair for the roommate to throw him out and then 
compensate him. One uses *his* right and incidentally 
hurts another. The other has no right behind his action.

		Jan Wasilewsky