Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site umich.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!mb2c!umich!torek From: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Nozick on Imposing Risk Message-ID: <463@umich.UUCP> Date: Wed, 12-Feb-86 17:32:14 EST Article-I.D.: umich.463 Posted: Wed Feb 12 17:32:14 1986 Date-Received: Fri, 14-Feb-86 07:34:15 EST References: <438@umich.UUCP> <28200630@inmet.UUCP> Reply-To: torek@umich.UUCP (Paul V. Torek ) Organization: University of Michigan, EECS Dept., Ann Arbor, MI Lines: 108 Summary: Ignore the "Lines" line; this is shorter than it looks >> = Nozick (quoted by Torek), > = janw@inmet. The first part of this article is my response to Jan W.; the rest answers questions on Nozick which probably won't interest many readers. >>" ... one might place [rights] as side constraints upon the actions to be >>done: don't violate constraints C. The rights of others determine the >>constraints upon your actions." (29) > >Except where rights significantly overlap, as is sometimes inevitable, >as illustrated by some pollution examples. >>"A line (or hyper-plane) circumscribes an area in moral space around an >>individual. > >Only in some ideal space. In life, the areas overlap. Does that >mean that demarcating them is a bad idea? Not at all, but such >demarcation is necessarily approximate, and grey areas are inev- >itable. >>... the following question arises: *Are others forbidden to >>perform actions that transgress the boundary or encroach upon the >>circumscribed area, or are they permitted to perform such actions >>provided that they compensate the person whose boundary has been crossed*? > >Ethically forbidden or legally forbidden ? If the area is, with >reasonable approximation, a "white" area of one person's right, >then *ethically* encroachment is forbidden, period. >If it is a "grey" area of overlapping rights, then side constraints >don't apply, and the ethical problem is that of maximizing a fairness >functional. Usually the best solution is some constructive compromise, >something creative and completely unexpected. Although you have certainly distinguished your position from Nozick's, this leaves a lot of questions unanswered. How do you identify which areas are "grey"? How should one deal with conflicting grey-area-rights, i.e. what is the "fairness function" that should be maximized? I'm not asking for a justification of the principles you would use here (though they shouldn't be ad hoc), just a description of those principles. One that doesn't circularly use moral terms (e.g., "you should do what's right" obviously wouldn't cut it). >It may turn out that some ethical rules *have* to be violated, to >avoid violating even more basic rules. This admission deletes >them from the list of side constraints, turning them into mere >desiderata. But if some kind of evil is necessary, it is no rea- >son to tolerate *another* kind of evil. Again, certain obvious questions arise. What makes a rule more basic? >The following *ethical equality* axiom is proposed: if an act is >forbidden, as a matter of principle, to one individual, it is >forbidden to any other. E.g., if I may not impose a tax on you, >neither should the Congress. But if you are allowed to protect >me from a mugger by force, so is the policeman. This sounds tempting even to a nonlibertarian like me, but I think you're ignoring the fact that institutional rules and roles can make a difference in what act is being performed. Whether an act counts as "act X" or "act Y", or even whether it counts as an intelligible act at all, depends on a social context. (See Alisdair MacIntyre's _After Virtue_ for an overdose of this point.) Of course, there may be *some* descriptions of acts which are social-context-neutral, but I see NO REASON to suppose without argument that these are the only descriptions which can legitimately figure in a moral theory. ---End intersting debate. Begin boring exegesis of Nozick. Hit 'n' now!--- >>"Political philosophy is concerned only with *certain* ways that persons >>may not use others; primarily, physically aggressing against them. ... >>Side constraints express the inviolability of others, in the ways they >>specify." (32) > >"May not" together with "political philosophy" introduces an ele- >ment of ambiguity: *morally* or *legally* may not ? Since the chapter I lifted this from was devoted to moral theory, I think he means "morally may not". >>" ... Our discussion of the first question we posed near the beginning >>of this chapter -- `Why not permit all boundary crossings provided >>compensation is paid?' -- has led us to the second question posed there -- >>`Why not prohibit all boundary crossings to which the victim has not >>consented in advance?' > >Permitted *by whom* ? Prohibited *by whom* ? By one's conscience ? >Or by "Society" ? The context of the chapter suggests Nozick meant "society" there. >Conclusion: Nozick is not my kind of libertarian. He is a collec- >tivist, a state fetishist and a social engineer: >--Behind all his "Should X be forbidden or permitted" stand the >"We", the consensus, forbidding or permitting (collectivism), >--delegating that function to a State with a monopoly of coer- >cion, above moral rules that individuals obey (state fetishism); These charges against Nozick, given your point of view, seem basically fair to me. >--and a perfect social system is constructed from first princi- >ples by a master engineer, to constrain the rest of us to virtu- >ous behavior. This one doesn't. I don't think Nozick has claimed to find the perfect, or even the best, social system. He fudges over a lot of questions and admits it. --Paul Torek torek@umich