Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!bellcore!decvax!ittatc!dcdwest!sdcsvax!ucbvax!brahms!weemba From: weemba@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Matthew P. Wiener) Newsgroups: net.crypt,net.politics Subject: Re: Enigma and the Eastern Front again Message-ID: <11877@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> Date: Sat, 15-Feb-86 07:41:21 EST Article-I.D.: ucbvax.11877 Posted: Sat Feb 15 07:41:21 1986 Date-Received: Mon, 17-Feb-86 21:09:37 EST References: <11809@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> <650@well.UUCP> Sender: usenet@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: weemba@brahms.UUCP (Matthew P. Wiener) Organization: University of California, Berkeley Lines: 97 Xref: lsuc net.crypt:105 net.politics:3295 In article <650@well.UUCP> rab@well.UUCP (Bob Bickford) writes: >> >> [ps- I will revert to email for the rest of this discussion unless >> someone besides Matthew and I is interested.] > > I, for one, am fascinated by this discussion and would appreciate at >least an occasional summary from the two of you. Glad you like it, but we are nearly at a consensus about our own positions, so there might not be too much more anymore. Here is essentially my response to Tom over e-mail: >Well, thanks for the info. But I think you have underestimated >my side of the story. The system wouldn't let me post a response >to your message when I tried, but: They're getting sick of us, eh? >(1). As I said I have read hundreds of books on the subject. > They are quite consistent with the hypotheses I presented. I believe it. >(2). The notion of a spy on the general staff was part of the > effort to hide the source of information. Yes, it's a common cover up for cryptological success. >(3). It is a lot of work to present references, so in a way the > request for references is slightly unfair. I was expecting a one-book reference! > On the other > hand I certainly can't expect you to accept what I have > said as proven. But I would ask that you put my theories > in the "possible" category, and investigate their truth > if you are interested. It certainly is possible. The world of cryptography is extremely weird. But the weaknesses I gave at the end of my last article seem too serious. >(4). Let me give a few more references off the top of my head, since > I don't have access to the UC library this semester. In > "Scorched Earth" by Paul Carrels (spelling/title may be a > little different), a book about the Eastern campaign, the > author traces the leak of information to the Soviets to > the very room where encrypted signals were broadcast, but > never considers the possibility that the cryptosystem was > insecure. After eliminating almost every other possibility, > he comes up with a theory that the people sending out the > info somehow stuck in some extra info about the keys in use. > (The book was published in the 1950's, I believe.) How about the possibility of the Soviets breaking Enigma themselves? The mathematical problem was solved once, why not a second time? My general feeling is that something so amazing as you propose would have been trumpeted in some book by now, using all the declassified Enigma material. I see no reason why Eastern front intercepts would be considered more sensitive. If anything, they would seem like a grand way to horn in on the credit! >Well, anyway, thanks for your interest in the subject. As I said, >although I don't claim I have proved my case, I have done a lot >of work in this area and I have more weapons in my arsenal, but >not a lot of time to argue about it. I would certainly like to read your paper that you mentioned. > If you have references for >your side, I would appreciate your sending me a list and where >I can aquire them, if you have time. Most of my references are of the negative variety: the chances where it could have been mentioned but it wasn't. You might also like L Kopolev, _Ease My Sorrows_, which is about the Malvino sharashka where much Soviet cryptography was done. A Solzhenitsyn, _The First Circle_, is a fiction- alized description of the camp. Concerning the Red Orchestra, Ballantine Books has a paperback series on military intelligence with, I believe, one book devoted to that topic. Where do you get declassified stuff? I don't really know, try writing Aegean Park Press/PO Box 2837/Laguna Hills CA 92653/(714) 586-8811. They've already published lots of stuff on WWI cryptography. I believe Cambridge University Press is publishing a series on Allied Intelligence in WWII, including Enigma intercepts as primary sources. Ask over at University Press Books on Bancroft. Also, check the bibliographies of R Lewin, _Ultra goes to War_, and Costello, _The Pacific War_ (?). Those books used Enigma/Purple intercepts, so they might have the information. And look through back issues of the journal _Cryptologia_. ucbvax!brahms!weemba Matthew P Wiener/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720