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From: peralta@dali.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Rene &)
Newsgroups: net.crypt,net.politics
Subject: Re: Enigma and the Eastern Front again
Message-ID: <11919@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Date: Tue, 18-Feb-86 20:52:37 EST
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.11919
Posted: Tue Feb 18 20:52:37 1986
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Reply-To: tedrick@ernie.berkely.edu
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[This is Tom, tedrick@ernie.berkely.edu] 

In article <11915@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> weemba@brahms.UUCP (Matthew P. Wiener) writes:
>Tom, you've missed my complaint!  I have read Stevenson's book (a long
>time ago), and please, a simple two or three paragraph summary would
>suffice.  But what you quote comes no closer to supporting your claim
>that THE BRITISH KEPT THE SOVIETS INFORMED OF THE CONTENTS OF EASTERN
>FRONT ENIGMA intercepts at key times *anytime* after Barbarossa.  I do
>not doubt your claim that the Russians knew more than has generally
>been admitted.  I *strongly* doubt the particular route you suggest,
>on both political and practical grounds.

Although I do claim that the British passed ULTRA based info
to the Soviets, I am not really concerned
with that point. What I am concerned with is the original problem
of whether cryptographic intercepts played an important role in
the campaign on the eastern front. Since you are a mathematician
I give you the benefit of the doubt in assuming that you are not
using rhetorical tricks in trying to sidetrack me from the point
of my argument :-)

If you are really only concerned with how the Soviets got the
ENIGMA information, not whether they had it, I would just as
soon stop this discussion, since my interest is in what effect
cryptography had in the military campaign.

So perhaps I should assume you admit my point that intercepts
of cryptographic information were of critical importance to
the Soviets throughout the eastern campaign? That is really all
am I concerned with.

>I would like to point out that I *did* mention in my original posting
>re the Eastern Front the importance of the Balkan delay in the start
>of Barbarossa.  OSS/Ultra was only part of the reason; the botched
>invasion of Greece by Italy certainly helped; Hitler's own insanity
>was just as important.  I am willing to throw Ultra in as part of the
>Balkan delay, but not give it equal credit with my other reasons.

Well, this is a subtle problem. I would call ULTRA a vital factor.
I think the importance of information in war has been underestimated.
Without the information, the other factors could not have been
exploited.  We can argue about the Balkan fiasco if you like, but I
am more interested in the later parts of the campaign in the east,
like Stalingrad and Kursk (2 of my favorite battles).

>To summarize my views:
>
>The role of cryptography in WWII has been ignored for nearly 40 years
>by just about everyone.  It is only now being granted its proper due
>(declassification helps!), but I think there is the revisionist danger
>of giving it too much credit.

Well, I certainly hope I am a dangerous revisionist! Stop me now if
you don't want to hear the rest of my revisionist views on the war
in the east :-)

  -Tom
   tedrick@ernie.berkely.edu