Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!decwrl!ucbvax!ernie.berkeley.edu!tedrick From: tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Tom Tedrick) Newsgroups: net.crypt,net.politics Subject: Enigma and the Eastern Front again Message-ID: <12021@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> Date: Mon, 24-Feb-86 18:33:29 EST Article-I.D.: ucbvax.12021 Posted: Mon Feb 24 18:33:29 1986 Date-Received: Wed, 26-Feb-86 20:46:16 EST Sender: usenet@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick) Organization: University of California, Berkeley Lines: 59 Keywords: more references, etc. Xref: linus net.crypt:530 net.politics:12948 To clarify things: I am interested in the theory of war, more particularly the role of information in that theory. The particular historical problem I find most interesting is the role of information leaks in the failure of German military operations in WW2. We seem have agreed that it is not completely clear how these leaks affected the campaign on the Eastern front, so I am focusing on that problem. As far as the theory of war, what I find most interesting is the role of planning, and how information affects planning. I think the "multiplicative" paradigm mentioned earlier is misleading, since information leads to qualitative rather than quantatative changes, i.e. different plans altogether. While the multiplicative paradigm is somewhat seductive at first glance, I cannot accept it without a lot more explanation. As far as how information reached the Soviets goes, I prefer not to worry so much about that, rather I am interested in how the Germans gave it away in the first place (ie mostly through insecure cryptosystems rather than traitors, I claim), whether the Soviets had it, and what use they made of it. Again this is because I am primarily interested in how it affected military operations. Hope that makes things clearer ... More references regarding the role of ULTRA in the Eastern Campaign: From "A Man Called Intrepid", by William Stevenson (Ballentine paperback first printed 1977) (I am almost finished reading this poorly written book, which however does contain a lot of interesting information (or disinformation as the case may be), and will get into something more interesting soon, I hope.) Page 419: (discussing among other things reasons for the raid on Dieppe, and overall Anglo-American strategy in 1942) "There was a compelling reason for Churchill's concern to convince the Soviet Union that a cross-channel invasion in 1942 would be suicidal. He wished to prevent Russia from deserting her allies. ULTRA and other Bletchley code-breaking teams were watching Russia flirt with the possibility of a negotiated peace. Germany dangled tempting bait. If the Soviet Union agreed to an armistice, Germany would be content with the land already captured. The Russians might take the bait if they believed Anglo-American strategy was to let Hitler and Stalin destroy one another, delaying a second front for this reason only. Churchill's fears were well founded, as ULTRA subsequently proved when it retrieved messages concerning the unprecedented journey that Molotov made, 200 miles into German occupied territory, to discuss a seperate peace with the Nazis in June 1943, an astonishing episode never officially made public." "The Molotov peace mission was wrapped in mystery until ULTRA's story became known thirty-one years later."