Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site garth.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!zeta!sabre!petrus!bellcore!decvax!decwrl!pyramid!hplabs!qantel!vlsvax1!garth!baba From: baba@garth.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Re: Conventional Arms Balance in Europe Message-ID: <263@garth.UUCP> Date: Sun, 16-Feb-86 21:30:18 EST Article-I.D.: garth.263 Posted: Sun Feb 16 21:30:18 1986 Date-Received: Sat, 22-Feb-86 09:07:13 EST References: <1245@pucc-i> <915@whuxl.UUCP> <1908@brl-tgr.ARPA> <516@whuts.UUCP> <257@garth.UUCP> <1288@pucc-i> Reply-To: baba@garth.UUCP (Baba ROM DOS) Organization: The Institute of Impure Science Lines: 34 Keywords: Docudrama, Euro-military-industrial Complex Michael Lewis writes: > What else would a book called "WW 3: August, 1985" that was written in >1979 be? General Sir John Hackett is hardly Rosemary Rogers. If you look at >the force levels he projected for 1985, I think that they jibe very well with >the current levels. But your primary source for current force levels seems to be Hackett's novel. If you have non-fiction figures available, why haven't you used them? I gave my copy away years ago, but my recollection is that his estimates of Soviet force levels were a little high, and his projections of non-US NATO force levels and effectiveness were wildly optimistic. > This is easy to do, because all of the relevant data is >presented in *tabular* form (rather strange for a novel). He wrote this >"novel" with the purpose of shaking the West out of its malaise, therefore it >was written with as much care and accuracy as possible. It is a *novel* >because General Hackett wanted to convey his message as widely as possible, >and deemed that a work of fiction would be the most effective way. Or, to put it another way, it was written as a piece of propaganda. When I read it, back in '80, I was appalled by Hackett's heavy-handed plumping for the European defense consortia. The pivotal roles given to such Euro-weapons as the Tornado MRCA and the re-armed British Polaris fleet were decidedly unrealistic. The theme that, fortunately, wise NATO military leaders in the early eighties were given the controversial and expensive weapons systems they wanted was flogged mercilessly. His "projected" force tables must be viewed with a certain amount of skepticism. As a novel, Hackett's book is awful. As propaganda, it's pretty good. It provides, if nothing else, an interesting insider's look at the NATO command structure, but as a reference for anything approaching serious debate on the balance of power in Europe, it is at best questionable. Baba