Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site kontron.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!bellcore!decvax!decwrl!pyramid!voder!kontron!cramer From: cramer@kontron.UUCP (Clayton Cramer) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Television coverage and censorship in Canada (in net.columbia??) Message-ID: <549@kontron.UUCP> Date: Sat, 1-Mar-86 19:05:22 EST Article-I.D.: kontron.549 Posted: Sat Mar 1 19:05:22 1986 Date-Received: Sun, 2-Mar-86 20:59:26 EST References: <6396@utzoo.UUCP> <514@kontron.UUCP> <814@alberta.UUCP> <534@kontron.UUCP> <819@alberta.UUCP> Distribution: net.politics Organization: Kontron Electronics, Irvine, CA Lines: 250 > I hope that you'll consider this "hot air" from northern Canada to be a > refreshing change from the arctic air we've been sending you all winter :-). > > >> ... Zundel was not charged with "doing something distasteful". > >> Neither was he indicted for his beliefs. The charge leveled at him was > >> something to the effect of "Trying to promote hatred". > >> To convict him they had to prove: > >> > >> 1) That what was he was saying was incorrect. > >> 2) That he knew it was incorrect. > >> 3) That his intent was to promote hatred against some group of people. > >> > >> As you can see, this law is not an attempt to supress something distasteful > >> but rather to outlaw something that is potentially damaging to the "health > >> of the society". The often used analogy is that of yelling fire in a crowded > >> movie theater, this is a clearly dangerous practice and should only be done > >> when the theater is actually on fire - thus the necessity of proving > >> statement 1. > > In article <534@kontron.UUCP> cramer@kontron.UUCP writes (with reference to > the above section): > > > >The first use of this argument *I've* ever seen was in an opinion by a U.S. > >Supreme Court justice. He was arguing in favor of a law that prohibited > >distributing anti-draft literature during World War I! Have I made my point > >about the dangers of giving the government too much discretion in deciding > >what is dangerous? > > You state the obvious. No one has argued that the government should > have too much discretion in deciding what is dangerous and that is why > Zundel was taken directly to court and NOT directly to prison. > It was the legal system that made the decision to convict - the decision > (in theory) could have been made in Zundels favour. I believe that > even in the U.S. the court system can decide against the government. This > "impartial" legal system is essential in any democracy since ALL governments > can be expected to act in their own best interests and this is sometimes > (usually) to the detriment of the people. The implied similarity between > anti-draft legislation and the Zundel case is flawed. > The courts decide the facts of the case. Did Zundel publish something false and inflammatory? An easy decision, from what I've read. My argument is against the validity of prohibiting false statements -- not whether he was given a fair trial or not. > > > >The Soviet Union uses similar reasoning to lock up people for "slandering > >the Soviet state" -- and we all recognize how dangerous giving that much > >decision making authority to the state is. > > > Ah! The obligatory comparison to the Soviet Union, hasn't this tactic > gotten a little trite :-( ? Your comparison lacks credibility. I don't > think that verifiable truth is one of the criteria for imprisoning people > in the Soviet Union. Central to this case, and to the interests of our > society, is the belief that the truth should not be repressed. > How do you propose to distinguish veriable truth from opinion? It's certainly true that 2+2=4 -- but when you get outside of hard science, determining "truth" becomes very difficult -- erring on the side of allowing nonsense seems less likely to put us into a situation where the government can define Truth as the Soviet Union does. > >> ... In Canada we've > >> decided that promoting hatred against religious/racial/(or any other > >> identifiable groups), is a detriment to the society as a whole and should > >> therefore be controlled. > > > >Oh? You prohibit Marxists from distributing literature that calls for > >"class struggle"? People can't write articles criticizing the practice > >of trade unionism? I believe the Canadian law only prohibits promoting > >hatred against groups based on race, religion, and national origin. Why > >not the Marxists as well? > > Because Marxists do not form an identifiable group, neither do > accountants or bank tellers. An "identifiable" group is one which - > *surprise* - can be readily identified. Skin colour, and other racial > characteristics can be easily identified as would the mode of dress of > various religious groups. Note also that women (and men) form identifiable > groups as well. I'm not at all sure what you're saying in the above passage. > To my knowledge, there is no restrictions against Marxists distributing > literature or against criticising the trade union movement. Any instance of > this occurring would clearly be political censorship. > My comments were directed at the overbroad assertion that the Canadian government prohibited hatred, as opposed to the actual restrictions of Canadian law. I think also you misunderstood what I said. Marxism promotes "class struggle", and teaches that the ruling classes and to some extent the bourgeois are enemies of the proletariat. This certainly promotes hatred of an economic class. (Read almost any of the Marxist newspapers regularly available in the United States if you don't think they promote hatred.) You certainly wouldn't prohibit Marxists from distributing materials that promoted such hatred, would you? Also, economic status isn't quite as difficult to disguise as race, but your comments above about how identifiable someone is as a member of class simply don't apply to members of religious minorities and ethnic groups. Can anyone distinguish a Jew from someone else by looking at them? Can you distinguish a person of Polish origin from someone else by looking at them? Of course not. Your argument above is flawed for this reason. By the reasoning above, such laws should only apply to racial groups and the two sexes. > >> The only reasonable questions that you could ask of this law are: > >> "Does it restrict the freedoms of the individual too much?" and "Does this > >> law actually benefit the society enough to justify it?". Canadians have > >> decided NO (to the first question) and YES (to the second). You probably > >> differ on this judgment but then you're entitled to your own opinions. > > > >Clearly, human rights are a national decision. And if the people of a > >central European power decide that exterminating Jews maximizes the benefit > >to society without too much of a law of individual liberties, that MUST > >be OK. :-) ... > > Can human rights be "logically" derived? The very essence of the term > "rights" is ambiguous - whether you're prepared to admit it or not, your > definition of what is a "human right" is a consensus definition from your > society. What criteria do we use to decide what is a human right? Does > this criteria take into account the society, or can we define "Human rights" > in a vacuum. It's certainly true that without a theistic basis, human rights must of necessity come from democratic decision. I know that many Objectivists will flame me for this, but I have to say to them is: 1. All the non-theistic human rights systems I've seen are circular. 2. Objectivists in particular tend to define human rights systems that are indistinguishable from the Judeo-Christian-based human rights system that was developed in England and America during the Enlightenment. However, my comments above, concerning the dangers of allow human rights to be defined by democratic decision stand. If the democracy decides that group B no longer has any rights, they don't, and most everyone will go along with the oppression because societies in this century have increasingly deified democracy. > Pardon me while I take a little digression. I suspect that if the common > man/woman had to come to a definition of human rights they would probably > resort to the old biblical principle - "Do unto others as you would have > them do unto you." This is a good general principle for forming a set > of human rights but it needs a two additions. The first would be that the > taking of a human life is the only fundamental right that can't be decided > upon by societal consensus. This principle probably wouldn't be needed since > in 99.9999% of the cases it's covered by the "Do unto others principle". > The only reason that I include it is the curious, and short lived, case > of the "Jonestown society". The second amending principle would be to > allow any and all additional liberties that don't seriously compromise > the first two. I, also, am an opponent of the death penalty, for a combination of religious beliefs and pragmatic reasons. (But that's a different discussion.) But I know this: your statement above acknowledges that you believe in at least one human right which is NOT subject to democratic decision making. You therefore do NOT believe that human rights are based on democratic consensus. Incidentally, I agree that the Golden Rule is a good basis for establishing a basis of human rights. Most of us in North America believe that. Now we can get down to brass tacks... > From this definition it should be clear that "human rights" is a > relative thing. In spite of your remarks above, stating that taking a human life is NOT relative. > Before you start believing that I condone the Soviet > system, I think that it is possible to "judge" whether a society is > fair in its application of human rights. Specifically we can judge > whether a society is violating its own "unwritten rights code". Consider > for instance, a fundamentalist Islamic society. Lets apply principle 1. > As a thinking member of that society I ask myself, "Would I like to have > Judaism, or Christianity forced on me?" - "No", "therefore we can't impose > Islam on other religious groups." However, a fundamentalist Islamic society doesn't necessarily believe in principle 1. And since human rights are relative, or so you say, what's wrong with the way they do things? > This also applies in political systems. Hence not only communists would > be elected and be allowed to represent Russians. Since few people like to > have their choices restricted, the first principle should guarantee > freedom of choice in almost all areas - including politics and religion. > Now, back to the main arguement ... > Even if the population wants the government to take away those choices? It happens. You seem to arguing that some rights are so important, that democratic consensus shouldn't apply. I might agree with you that a society shouldn't discard choices -- but I would also argue that democratic action doesn't allow discarding choices, because human rights aren't relative. > Any suggestion that "fundamental human rights" can be defined without > reference to theological, political, or metaphysical dogma - or even > ignoring good old, practical societal consensus - is ludicrous to the > extreme! > I agree. > > ... Seriously, when human rights are reduced to something that can > >be decided by a purely democratic decision, you have to watch out that you > >don't fall down the slippery slope to totalitarianism. > > The "slippery slope to totalitarianism" starts the moment that you pay > someone to make your decisions for you. The case of genocide cited above > is due, NOT to democratic consensus, but to independent government decision. > The above society was not open to the free interchange of ideas > since there was a prevailing sense of fear and opposing the government > meant death or some equally unsavory fate. Thus no democratic opinion > could be obtained and even if it could it wouldn't have been acted on. > But the decision to start down the "slippery slope" was democratic. (Once they started down the slope, the government took steps to prevent heading back up.) Does a democracy have the right to dispose of human rights? You say democratic consensus defines these rights. If so, democratic consensus can define human rights in whatever manner they believe. > > > >> As to whether Canada practices political censorship, that is not > >> at issue in the above case. But while we're on the topic, do you remember > >> good old Senator McCarthy? It seems to me that "those who live in glass > >> houses shouldn't throw stones"(:-))! If you have a real case of political > >> censorship in Canada I'd be interested to hear it. I suspect however, that > >> you were misled by Snells discourse, and I hope that my misleading diatribe > >> clarifies the issue :-). > >> Ken Hruday > >> University of Alberta > > > >I wasn't arguing that our own house was completely in order. Someone on > >the net tried to claim that there was no political censorship in Canada. > >No, they just lock people up for publishing books that get people angry. > > > > To beat a dead horse - I am not aware of any cases of political censorship > in Canada. I am arguing that the Zundel business is not an instance of > "political" censorship. The only credible case you could have for calling it > political censorship is if you define all censorship to be "political" - then > I might agree with you. > > Ken Hruday > University of Alberta I'm glad we agree that Zundel was censored. (Worse, thrown in jail for what he said.)