Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!ucbvax!brahms!desj From: desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins) Newsgroups: net.politics.theory Subject: Re: Pollution (Eminent Domain) Message-ID: <12032@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> Date: Tue, 25-Feb-86 07:01:45 EST Article-I.D.: ucbvax.12032 Posted: Tue Feb 25 07:01:45 1986 Date-Received: Thu, 27-Feb-86 05:31:02 EST References: <421@umich.UUCP> <28200611@inmet.UUCP> Sender: usenet@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Reply-To: desj@brahms.UUCP (David desJardins) Organization: University of California, Berkeley Lines: 70 In article <28200611@inmet.UUCP> janw@inmet.UUCP writes: >.......... >Both conditions are necessary. >E.g., if I propose to buy your car and you refuse, no court >should be able to appoint a price at which you *have* to sell. >Thus, eminent domain is morally unjustifiable. When you use words like "should," it seems you take on the responsibility to justify what you say, and not just present it as a fact. It seems to me that there are many examples where it is in the public interest to do precisely what you refer to above. For example, suppose I patent an invention and then refuse to allow it to be used. Is it not in the public interest to require that I make my invention available to others at a reasonable price? Or suppose I have a natural monopoly on the production of some essential item. Should I be allowed to take advantage of this to wield power over individuals? Note that the problem as stated would never occur for rational individuals, since to a rational being the value of every commodity, even his life, is finite. But (1) not all individuals behave rationally, and (2) an equivalent problem occurs if I seek to form a monopoly and demand unreasonable profits. Government intervention becomes necessary (or at least desirable) in both of these situations. >Now suppose I smashed your car in an accident. Compensation will >*not* be determined by you unilaterally (e.g., a pound of >flesh). I am wrong, but I still have my rights. Why is there a difference? If the cost to you is the same, why should the compensation differ. It seems that it is your position which is logically unjustifiable. >Now consider two people breathing in a stuffy room. *Both* are >polluters, both victims and by the same process. None holds a >moral trump card. If, for whatever reason (say, a garlic diet), >one pollutes *more*, there is still no trump card - it is a >matter of degree; he has a right to breath; finite compensation >is appropriate. No question here. >"A right not to be imposed upon" is ambiguous. >You interpret it as "right not to be harmed or inconvenienced". >By your definition, if the *existence* of someone gets on >my nerves and shortens my life, that person owes me whatever >I ask (such as to terminate his existence). And for some >reason you consider this bizarre position libertarian. It seems that *you* are the one who has said that the individual, not the courts, decides the cost. Agreed the position as stated is absurd, but if we modify it so that the cost is decided by the courts (what I will call the "true cost") then it seems perfectly correct. You have to be careful here. Suppose we postulate the existence of a parasitic life form, which cannot exist without harming another individual. My position would be that its continued existence would be dependent on its willingness and ability to pay the cost (the true cost, not whatever may be asked) to the host of its existence. Is your position that if the parasite has no ability to pay then its right to exist should override the host's rights to avoid inconvenience? This seems to be what you are saying... -- David desJardins [Note: the above can be reread in two ways. First let "parasitic list form" = "vampire," and consider whether it has a right to suck your blood. Then let "parasitic life form" = "human fetus" and consider whether it has a right to be carried to term.] Disclaimer: I am not a libertarian. To some this will be sufficient reason to ignore everything I say...