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From: gwyn@brl-smoke.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.crypt
Subject: Re: WWII Cryptography --> WWIII
Message-ID: <1812@brl-smoke.ARPA>
Date: Fri, 14-Mar-86 14:35:43 EST
Article-I.D.: brl-smok.1812
Posted: Fri Mar 14 14:35:43 1986
Date-Received: Mon, 17-Mar-86 04:15:25 EST
References: <2302@utcsri.UUCP>
Reply-To: gwyn@brl.ARPA
Distribution: net
Organization: Ballistic Research Lab (BRL)
Lines: 29

In article <2302@utcsri.UUCP> hofbauer@utcsri.UUCP (John Hofbauer) writes:
>Anyhow, I would like to enlarge the discussion to include
>the future. Suppose, heaven forbid, WWIII should break out.
>Speculate on the role of cryptography in such a conflict.
>Would each side be able to keep its most secret secrets secret
>by using "unbreakable" codes? How would the Yanks try to
>break such codes? What if the Russki's knocked out Fort Mead?
>Could they? Can/would the allies be trusted? Would it be over
>so fast that it wouldn't even matter? Start slinging...

First, be aware that tactical intelligence and signal security are
the responsibility of the armed services, each of which has a junior
counterpart to the NSA.  For a variety of reasons, field cryptosystems
tend to be less secure against analysis than strategic or diplomatic
systems.  Sometimes nominally secure systems break down or are misused.
Traffic analysis is also a very important source of intelligence.
Therefore, communications intelligence will be of some importance in
actual conflict situations.  Whether or not it would be a decisive
factor is hard to predict; much depends on luck.

Keeping secrets is primarily a human problem, and no cryptosystem
can guarantee that secrets won't be lost, bought, or stolen.

As far as breaking "unbreakable" codes goes, one has to capture
traffic that is generated by broken crypto gear, or else supplement
the traffic with auxiliary information such as known "cribs", or in
some cases capture the same message with different encipherments
("isomorphs").  Some cryptosystems are resistant to all such
attacks and are truly "unbreakable" (e.g. one-time pads).