Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site psuvax1.UUCP
Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ukma!psuvm.bitnet!psuvax1!berman
From: berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman)
Newsgroups: net.crypt,net.politics
Subject: Re: Engima and the Eastern Front
Message-ID: <2029@psuvax1.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 18-Mar-86 23:57:48 EST
Article-I.D.: psuvax1.2029
Posted: Tue Mar 18 23:57:48 1986
Date-Received: Fri, 21-Mar-86 07:12:33 EST
References: <12371@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Organization: Pennsylvania State Univ.
Lines: 55
Xref: watmath net.crypt:617 net.politics:14055

> from Panzer Battles, by Major General F. W. von Mellenthin
> (Ballentine paperback edition, printed 1984)
> (First published 1956)
>
> (a good book, by the way, for those interested in the subject)
>
> [on the encirclemnt of German forces at Stalingrad, pages 201-203]
>
> " ... meanwhile the Russian offensive had been launched with a
> crushing superiority in numbers and all the advantages of
> surprise."
>
> "On 19 November General Rokossovsky's Tank Army attacked in
> overwhelming strength ... in conjunction with an attack from
> [another bridgehead] ... both blows fell on Rumanians ...
> I pass in silence the scenes of panic and confusion produced
> by this new Russian offensive; the two thrusts made rapid
> headway ..."
>
> [a frequent Soviet tactic was (and is :-) to attack the weakest
> points, in this case the Rumanian armies, whose morale, training
> and equipment was below the German standard. This illustrates
> one way in which information about locations of enemy forces
> is useful. Since voluminous reports were sent from the front
> to Hitler containing such information, cryptographic intercepts
> would have been particularly rich sources of such information.
> Of course there are other ways of getting some idea of where
> enemy forces are, but there is nothing like having the whole
> thing handed to you on a silver platter via crypto intercepts.]
>
One of the most standard technique of intelligence gathering of
the Soviet Army was sending special 'intelligence troops' across
the front line to catch so called 'tongues', i.e. enemy soldiers.
After several months of stalemate Soviets had to know where are
German units, and where are Italian, Hungarian and Romanian
units.  Thus the value of crypto intercepts was quite moderate
under those circumstances.  Additionally, during the retreat
(and during 1942 it was quite ordrerly one) Soviets left some
intelligence personell on the other side of the front.  Keep in
the relevant information was not a set of encrypted messages, but
the physical location of very large units.  Thus it was sufficient
to observe railroad movement etc. to figure the location of
German units in the rear of the front.  Thus I would think that
the influence of Western supplied intelligence was not crucial.
Even more, if German generals were competent at all, they had
to expect that the counter-offensive would go through the
Romanian segment of the front.  However, after overextending
their forces by the offensive in two directions simultaneously
(Volga and Caucasus), they had to little room for maneouver
besides the retreat on at least one direction, which was a thing
vetoed by Hitler.
> [being able to read such signals would obviously be of great help
Piotr Berman

*** REPLACE THIS LINE WITH YOUR MESSAGE ***