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From: desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins)
Newsgroups: net.puzzle,net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Newcomb's Paradox
Message-ID: <12539@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Date: Fri, 21-Mar-86 19:05:19 EST
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.12539
Posted: Fri Mar 21 19:05:19 1986
Date-Received: Sat, 22-Mar-86 23:03:12 EST
References: <12518@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
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Reply-To: desj@brahms.UUCP (David desJardins)
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
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Xref: watmath net.puzzle:1539 net.philosophy:4579


   I am keeping this in net.philosophy because that seems much more relevant
to what I have to say (and because I want to see the responses and can't
stand to read net.puzzle); in particular I want to discuss the value of
rational thought.

   I would be willing to believe that with sufficient knowledge of the state
of my brain a sufficiently resourceful opponent could indeed predict with
high probability my response to this situation (given sufficient evidence
to this effect).  I also believe that the rational course of behavior is
to take both boxes.  Certainly this maximizes your expected yield in the
given situation.  But, as I noted, I do expect to get only $1000 this way.

   The only way to "win" this game is to make the (conscious or unconscious)
decision *in advance* to take only the one box.  In fact, no matter what your
choice at the actual event, you are always at least as well off to have been
committed beforehand to take only the one box!
   Nevertheless, to take only one box is by its nature an *irrational*
decision.  Not irrational in terms of results, but irrational when contrasted
with desirable behavior in other circumstances.

   So essentially you have to decide, *in advance*, that you are going to
make an irrational decision in certain circumstances.  This advance decision
is, in itself, rational, since its result can be foreseen to be favorable.
But it represents a compromise.  Such a movement away from rationality has
its own costs in all sorts of other situations.  I personally place such a
high value on rational behavior that I consider the cost to be too great.

   I admit that this something of a cop-out, in that my unwillingness to make
this compromise is largely based on my low estimate of the probability of
such a situation.  Suppose our society gave this test to every individual at
a certain age.  Then the compromise would certainly be worthwhile.  Even the
known existence of such a precogniter might sway me; I don't know.  All I
know is that at the moment I am not willing to make this compromise with
irrationality.

   -- David desJardins