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From: desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins)
Newsgroups: net.puzzle,net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Newcomb's Paradox
Message-ID: <12569@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Date: Sun, 23-Mar-86 01:55:05 EST
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.12569
Posted: Sun Mar 23 01:55:05 1986
Date-Received: Tue, 25-Mar-86 03:24:37 EST
References: <12518@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> <12539@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> <12549@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Sender: usenet@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
Reply-To: desj@brahms.UUCP (David desJardins)
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
Lines: 37
Keywords: rationality
Xref: watmath net.puzzle:1549 net.philosophy:4602

In article <12549@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> gsmith@brahms.UUCP (Gene Ward Smith)
writes [in response to my posting]:
>   I think the irrationality you perceive is not in the behavior of the
>box-taker, but in the situation. In spite of saying that you accept it
>as conceivable, you appear to be implicitly rejecting it. Fine, except
>that this is the premise. The premise *must* be accepted before attempting
>to find the rational answer to the problem. The rational answer then is
>(by definition, I maintain) the one which gives you the highest return.
>This is the *same* definition of rationality which we employ under other,
>less peculiar, circumstances.
>
>   I think one source of difficulty is the idea "taking the second box
>won't change the circumstances; it can't change what is in the boxes
>already". But the *premise* says that deciding to take both boxes is
>a circumstance which does affect what is in the boxes. You should either
>accept the premise, or maintain that it is impossible.

   Aha!  The problem is that we are interpreting the problem differently.
Your concept of precognition apparently involves the direct observation of
future events; i.e. the reversal of cause and effect.  If this were the
case of course one would take only one box.

In article <12539@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> desj@brahms (David desJardins) writes:
>   I would be willing to believe that with sufficient knowledge of the state
>of my brain a sufficiently resourceful opponent could indeed predict with
>high probability my response to this situation (given sufficient evidence
>to this effect).

   In other words, the precognition on which I am basing my statements is
essentially a sophisticated modeling process which attempts to predict from
observable data how I will respond to a given situation.
   If I were presented with incontrovertible evidence of successful precog-
nition this is the working assumption I would make about its methodology,
and thus my response to the situation would be based on this assumption.
   Reread my posting and see if it makes any more sense in this context.

   -- David desJardins