Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site psuvax1.UUCP Path: utzoo!lsuc!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ukma!psuvm.bitnet!psuvax1!berman From: berman@psuvax1.UUCP (Piotr Berman) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: Dangerous Military Myth Message-ID: <2020@psuvax1.UUCP> Date: Thu, 13-Mar-86 17:57:37 EST Article-I.D.: psuvax1.2020 Posted: Thu Mar 13 17:57:37 1986 Date-Received: Sat, 15-Mar-86 23:22:41 EST References: <373@ihnet.UUCP> <711@mtuxn.UUCP>, <377@ihnet.UUCP> <719@mtuxn.UUCP> Organization: Pennsylvania State Univ. Lines: 96 > I did post an article > with (my opinion), reasonable estimates, which puts the US at about > 10,000 strategic warheads and about 2000 missles and bombers. >................................ > >It does not do any good to give soldiers 57 riffles per person, > >since each can only wield one (at most two). [Similarly, we do not need more nuclear weapons.] > True, 57 rifles per soldier is a point of diminishing returns. However, > ........................ > ..................... The parallel _I_ draw is between > having 57 soldiers and 1 soldier. Is there a point of diminishing returns > here? Probably yes, after all 35 soldiers to 1 is most likely as effective > as 57 to 1. That is how I see the question. We aren' talking about > imbalanced weapons systems (all nukes can fly to target if so ordered), > we're talking about relative force levels. And those force levels > don't favor the US. The argument here is that as long as we have less weapons than the other side, it makes sence to purchase new weapons. However, you ignore the purpose of weapons. Imagine that prices A and B have one fortress each. Prince A build a tunnel under the fortress of B and filled it with gunpowder. At this moment A thought that B is at his mercy, only to learn that B filled TWO tunnels with gunpowder under the portress of A I forsee two courses of action for A: i. dig the second tunnel; ii. negotiate with B to empty the tunnels in a verifiable way. I personally would think that ii is better. In the case of strategic nuclear weapons there are two applications for them. One is destroying nuclear weapons, the other is to destroy anything else. Inspect first the second purpose, which is destruction of non- -nuclear targets. How many targets in US, with radius of 5-10 miles would you mark for destruction as a Soviet strategist? I bet that 1000 such targets would contain the majority of population, and vast majority of industry. Say that you loose those targets and receive entire Warsaw pact teritory (although substancially destroyed). Does it pay? If no, do the reverse exercise. You are given the Soviet Union, remove from it (and other Warsaw pact nations) 1000 of targets and receive as the prise destroyed West Europe. Now we see why MAD secures West Europe against Soviet blitz-krieg. You can also notice that giving one side twice as many warheads will not change the equation very much, since the first thousand will destroy majority of the wealth in North America and Europe anyway. MAD doctrine was found repulsive for many reasons. The most important one is that it renders majority of conventional arsenals useless. What would be the purpose of thousands of M1-tanks if not the war in Europe, the choisest battleground of the two military blocks? If we stick to MAD in the broad sence, than our plan for the hypothetical Soviet invasion on West Europe (or Japan) is to destroy first some marginal targets and claim that if the hostilities will not cease, the full blow will follow. How then to justify levels of armament unknown to human kind before the WWII? Invent another doctrine!!! Therefore now we are supposed to be able to wipe out so many Soviet missiles that they will be unable to wipe-out our missiles or, more ambitious program, have so many missiles that even after the "first strike" we will be able to wipe-out their missiles. In the meantime, our boys defend the West Europe and Japan using all the fancy gear (which presumably contains portable concret shelters). MAD leaves, the window of vunrability enters the stage. > You can claim that force levels don't matter, > or that a weaker force level is better, but both of those are > counter-intuitive. That's why I say you bear the burden of proof. > As I argued, with MAD doctrine you have limited demand for weapons, with the newer ones we have unlimited. Many people think that all doctrines other than MAD are irrelevant, since when we pursue the alternative scenarios, every side may be destroyed anyway, with possible exclusion of the content of hardened silos. Would any sane (albeit evil) Soviet leader wage a war merely because some of the strategic missiles can survive, while the cities cannot? Does the profitability equation change dramatically? > > >Although we may disagree on the exact number, it is economic fallacy > >to assert that more nuclear weapons is *always* better. Excess is possible. > > I'm not asking for an indefinitely large nuclear force, just bigger than it > is now, and riding better delivery vehicles. > Why? To more accurately destroy land-based missiles, but to still leave alone submarines? What is the size of the gain? An additional day for WWIII? > > Karl Dahlke ihnp4!ihnet!eklhad > Guy Piotr Berman