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From: mokhtar@ubc-vision.UUCP (Farzin Mokhtarian)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: The 1967 War
Message-ID: <100@ubc-vision.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 25-Mar-86 00:30:45 EST
Article-I.D.: ubc-visi.100
Posted: Tue Mar 25 00:30:45 1986
Date-Received: Tue, 25-Mar-86 08:56:10 EST
Organization: UBC Computational Vision Lab, Vancouver, B.C., Canada
Lines: 62

Subject: The 1967 War

> Interesting to notice that Farzin Mokhtarian agrees that in
> early 1967 Nasser had closed the waterways and kicked the UN
> observers. But, Farzin KNOWS that Nasser had no intent of going
> to war. The proof? His chief of staff!! Come on! Are you serious?
> [Y. Levendel] 

Which country's chief of staff are we talking about here, Mr. Levendel?!
   
I quoted General Yitzhak Rabin. Does that sound like an Egyptian name to you?
  
He was the *Israeli* Chief of Staff in 1967. Later on, he became the Prime
minister of Israel. It was he who said that he did not "believe that Nasser
wanted war." 
   
Rabin was not the only one. General Matitiahu Peled, one of the architects of
the Israeli victory said the following in spite of pleas to keep silent for
the sake of Israel's reputation in the world.

"There is no reason to hide the fact that since 1949 no one was able to
 threaten the very existence of Israel. In spite of that fact, we have
 continued to foster a sense of our own inferiority. To claim that the
 Egyptian forces concentrated on our borders were capable of threatening
 Israel's existence not only insults the intelligence of anyone capable
 of analyzing this kind of situation, but is an insult to Zahal (the
 Israeli army)."                        [Maariv, March 24, 1972]

None of his military colleagues seriously contested his central thesis.

> I will grant Farzin that I do not really know the undercover aspects
> of the 1967 war and that it is possible that Israel used the  issue
> of the water passage as a "golden opportunity". But, then, why give
> to Israel a good reason to do it? At first glance, this does not strike
> me as a solid explanation.                     

Israeli generals worked hard to make sure that Nasser had very little choice.
Raif Hijab has already mentioned how Israel made Syria its target of
military activism. These were accompanied by verbal threats to overthrow
the Syrian government and Israeli tank movements to the north. Syrians were
convinced that Israel was about to attack them.
  
Even though  Nasser did not  want war, he  had to show  that he was
prepared to go to war with Israel if Israel attacked Syria and that
required the removal of the UN forces. Even then, Nasser only aimed at
a partial withdrawal. He asked the UNEF commander to withdraw his  men
from the Israeli-Egyptian border but not from Sharm al-Shaikh, the outpost
at the  mouth of the Gulf of Aqaba, which furnished symbolic protection
for the  passage of Israeli ships. The UN Secretary General insisted
that it had  to be all or nothing. Nasser was forced to make it all
and to impose the blockade.
  
General Aharon Yariv (Israeli again!) had predicted this when he said:
"To my eyes no alternative means that we are creating such a situation
that it is impossible for the Egyptians not to act because the strain
on their prestige will be unbearable." 
                                                -- Farzin Mokhtarian
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"From the pit of decay and dust
 Through blood and sweat
 A generation will arise to us."