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From: ladkin@kestrel.ARPA (Peter Ladkin)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy,net.sci
Subject: Re: Contempt prior to Investigation
Message-ID: <5909@kestrel.ARPA>
Date: Mon, 17-Mar-86 20:05:37 EST
Article-I.D.: kestrel.5909
Posted: Mon Mar 17 20:05:37 1986
Date-Received: Wed, 19-Mar-86 04:43:31 EST
References: <435@ccivax.UUCP> <13400007@uiucdcsp> <12239@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> <695@hounx.UUCP>
Organization: Kestrel Institute, Palo Alto, CA
Lines: 21
Xref: watmath net.philosophy:4513 net.sci:612

In article <695@hounx.UUCP>, kort@hounx.UUCP (B.KORT) writes:
> Conventional theories are *not* complete.  (If they were, there would
> be no need for scientific research and theoretical studies.)

There are at least two possible meanings of *complete*. 
One is, formally deriving all truths in the intended interpretation.
Here, the language is adequately expressive, and the deductive
power of the theory is being questioned.
Another is, whether the theory adequately expresses the 
intended interpretation.
Which sense, (or maybe another) did you intend?

Karl Popper and others have pointed out that attempts 
should be made to falsify theories, and that a good theory
is one which resists falsification. Even (or especially)
with a *complete* theory (in either sense), attempts
should be made to falsify predictions, on this view.
This is a reason for continued research which is independent
of the *complete*ness or otherwise of the theories.

Peter Ladkin