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From: joels@tekred.UUCP (Joel Swank)
Newsgroups: net.columbia,net.space
Subject: Re: Morton-Thiokol Engineering Claims
Message-ID: <459@tekred.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 5-Mar-86 18:27:29 EST
Article-I.D.: tekred.459
Posted: Wed Mar  5 18:27:29 1986
Date-Received: Sat, 8-Mar-86 21:36:53 EST
References: <1301@decwrl.DEC.COM> <564@mmm.UUCP>
Organization: Tektronix, Beaverton OR
Lines: 20
Xref: watmath net.columbia:2593 net.space:6292

> 	If the MT engineers were 75% sure that the shuttle would not make
> it, would that justify "going to the media" (aka "going over their bosses'
> heads")? What, then, if the 25% chance happened and all went well? They'd
> be in the bread lines, that's what. The bosses made the decisions, and at
> some point, you have to acknowledge the authority of those "in power". You
> really don't want that sort of anarchy going on in a company that handles
> such sensitive ventures as this. You want to invest the authority in the 
> right people and in the right decision-making systems, and follow those
> rules.
> 

The engineers weren't at all sure the SRBs would fail. The main point made
by Allen McDonald was that they DIDN'T KNOW what effects the weather would
have on the seals. This lack of data should be enough to scrub launch. Instead,
NASA used it as a point in FAVOR of launching. This seems contrary to their
policy in the past, when the engineers had to PROVE beyond a reasonable
doubt that their systems would work.

Joel Swank
Tektronix, Redmond, Oregon