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From: lotto@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (Ben Lotto)
Newsgroups: net.puzzle,net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Newcomb's Paradox
Message-ID: <12682@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Date: Wed, 26-Mar-86 13:02:02 EST
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.12682
Posted: Wed Mar 26 13:02:02 1986
Date-Received: Fri, 28-Mar-86 05:41:56 EST
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Xref: watmath net.puzzle:1565 net.philosophy:4711

In article <754@hounx.UUCP> kort@hounx.UUCP (B.KORT) writes:
>I agree with Jeff Sonntag that Newcomb's Paradox suggests that
>perfect precognition is impossible. . . . 
>. . . an omniscient God cannot *reveal*
>his prediction of which breakfast cereal the stubbornly willful
>and defiant mortal will select.  

All that you have proved here is that perfect precognition is
inconsistent with free will.  If the hypotheses of the puzzle were
ever truly met (with transparent boxes), then the person faced
with the "choice" on decision day would really have no choice;
since, BY HYPOTHESIS, the perfect precognicent is a PERFECT
PRECOGNICENT, the "chooser" WILL make the appropriate selection.

Conclusion: Either free will and perfect precognition are incompatible,
or one must have a great deal of constraints on the perfect precognicent
being on exactly when he is allowed to exercise his power.   (Perhaps
this is why we haven't heard from God in such a long time?)

-Ben   (ucbvax!brahms!lotto / lotto@brahms.Berkeley.EDU)
       (Dept of Mathematics, UC Berkeley, Berkeley, CA  94720)