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From: gsmith@weyl.berkeley.edu.BERKELEY.EDU (Gene Ward Smith)
Newsgroups: net.puzzle,net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Newcomb's Paradox
Message-ID: <12696@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Date: Thu, 27-Mar-86 00:44:43 EST
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.12696
Posted: Thu Mar 27 00:44:43 1986
Date-Received: Fri, 28-Mar-86 05:48:51 EST
References: <12518@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> <1480@mhuxt.UUCP> <754@hounx.UUCP> <12682@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
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In article <12682@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> lotto@brahms.UUCP (Ben Lotto) writes:

>All that you have proved here is that perfect precognition is
>inconsistent with free will.  If the hypotheses of the puzzle were
>ever truly met (with transparent boxes), then the person faced
>with the "choice" on decision day would really have no choice;
>since, BY HYPOTHESIS, the perfect precognicent is a PERFECT
>PRECOGNICENT, the "chooser" WILL make the appropriate selection.

     It seems to me that precognition would still be compatible with
free will in one agent -- the one with precognition. This agent could
figure out what it was going to do by deciding, and then would of course
know. Maybe God is free and we are all robots?

ucbvax!brahms!gsmith    Gene Ward Smith/UCB Math Dept/Berkeley CA 94720
        Fifty flippant frogs / Walked by on flippered feet
    And with their slime they made the time / Unnaturally fleet.