Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!bellcore!decvax!decwrl!spar!ellis From: ellis@spar.UUCP Newsgroups: net.bio,net.origins,net.philosophy Subject: Occam vs Telos Message-ID: <246@spar.UUCP> Date: Mon, 5-May-86 15:00:39 EDT Article-I.D.: spar.246 Posted: Mon May 5 15:00:39 1986 Date-Received: Wed, 7-May-86 02:13:20 EDT References: <211@spar.UUCP> <1028@cybvax0.UUCP> <1188@umcp-cs.UUCP> Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA Lines: 112 Xref: watmath net.bio:442 net.origins:3075 net.philosophy:5263 >>> me >> Mike Huybensz > Charles Wingate >>> I guess I shouldn't be surprised that so many are quick to assert that >>> Aristotle's `telos' (roughly `purpose, goal, or aim') has no place in >>> scientific explanation. After all, physics and chemistry flourished only >>> after purging all but efficient causes, yes? > >>Yes. Purpose and goals have no place in scientific theory about (literally) >>brainless subjects because adding them to an explanation adds no more >>predictive or descriptive ability. Thus Occam's Razor throws out "purpose" >>and "goals" in favor of "function". (There are meanings of "function" that >>do not imply purpose.) I'll temporarily pass on the distinction between goal and function, pending a clear definition from anybody on just what a "function" is in this context. To me, this word is tied too strongly to its mathematical and computer science sense. If "function" as you use the word here means "direction towards a desirable future state of affairs", especially where desirable means "serving to maintain or increase fitness", then we are merely arguing over which label to call it. That's no different from Aristotle's "telos", or "purpose" cloaked in the clinically sterile "function". And the determination of such "telea" or "purposes" is most definitely something that is of interest to biology. They OUGHT to be distinguished from the direct material and efficient causes of physics or chemistry because they are totally unlike anything occurring at the push-pull level of immediate physical causality -- their real origins lie not in the immediate past but are have stupendously convoluted roots buried deep in the distant evolutionary past. Concerning your use of Occam's razor, a recent quote from C. Dyke: Occam's razor depends always on a criterion internal to a particular theory. The simplest explanations for the phenomena we like to explain by evolutionary theory are those preferred by some freshmen: God made it that way.. [One sequel of this argument] involves spelling out the metaphysical commitments underlying the two opposing views. No matter how the dialog unfolds, the invocation of Occam's razor must be absolutely question-begging.. [The other sequel] consists of the teacher leveling the charge of unscientificness against the student. But this is a dangerous move, for the student must be sufficiently impressed by the wonders of science if the charge is to have any persuasive power. Only when .. the student's dependence on the fruits of scientifically grounded technology is established.. can Occam's razor be invoked. But the key move is not the razor stroke. The key is the entrapment of the student in an internal commitment to science.. One-dimensional selection models seem simple to selectionists, but dressed up in qualifying caveats until only their own mother could recognize them, their simplicity is far from obvious to the unfaithful.. The real issue is which models, handled with which epistemological strategies, are the better ones.. as explainers and research generators. None of the sides between in a dsipute between theories can insist on the a priori authoritative stance that would be required in order for Occam's razor to have an persuasive force. I notice that you occasionally use mentalisms like "purpose" and "intent" in your articles. In fact, I do not see how it is possible to extricate human understanding, including all scientific epistemologies, from the basic fabric of our mentalisms, teleological or otherwise. Science itself has an internal commitment to anthropocentrism: it explains reality to humans. If teleological explanations have the power to reliably predict or describe, they are as useful as any other kinds of explanations. If they can eventually be reduced to immediate push-pull forces upon atoms in the void, so much the better for everybody, teleologists and reductionists alike. Eliminative reductionism strikes me as saying "We have the binary to a program, consequently, we can throw away the high level code, comments, and documentation". In a sense, you're right -- all those other things can be re-generated from the object given enormous effort. But is a bunch of numbers the same as understanding how the program really works? I'd rather have the high-level code with plenty of teleological comments. >Actually, the reason for the rejection of "purposes" is much simpler: the >notion of purpose is inherently subjective. That's begging the question at hand: What is "objective"? If biological entities truly possess goal-oriented behavior, then is our so-called "anthropomorphic" tendency to see purpose in living things not a reflection of nature as it really is? In the past, we were not able to understand how there could be mechanisms behind purposeful behavior. That is not the case today. I can easily write a computer program that behaves as though it had a purpose, say, to win a game. If you were to analyze its behavior teleologically, your description in intentional terms would be perfectly useful for a hacker to subsequently to reduce this high-level description to an equivalent program, or, alternatively, to synthesize a rigorous functional explanation of its disassembled code into a form usable by humans. Is there such a thing as THE objective description of anything? By my account, "objective" means "sanctified by some scientific methodology". Period. -michael Bohr undid what Copernicus had accomplished: he reinstated Man at the center of his description of the world, wherefrom Copernicus had expelled him. -Bernard d'Espagnat