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From: desj@brahms.BERKELEY.EDU (David desJardins)
Newsgroups: net.crypt,net.politics
Subject: Re: Who can be secure?
Message-ID: <13481@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Date: Mon, 28-Apr-86 06:11:27 EDT
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.13481
Posted: Mon Apr 28 06:11:27 1986
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Reply-To: desj@brahms.UUCP (David desJardins)
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Keywords: 1 time pads, 1 time pads, 1 time pads, ...
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In article <13462@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP
(Tom Tedrick) writes:
>>  Assuming the information about breaking new Libyan codes within weeks
>>  is correct, does that imply that the NSA is
>>  stellar at the job it does, or that the Libyans use weak
>>  crypto-systems?  
>
>The Libyans use weak crypto-systems.

   I disagree.  They may or may not, but this is not the point.  The reason
we can break their codes within weeks is most likely because their key
security is poor, not because they use a weak system.

>>  Is it realistically possible today for a small country or a large
>>  company to independently secure its communications from organizations
>>  such as NSA or the Soviet equivalent?
>
>Yes.

   Again, I disagree, with some reservations.  For small, extremely important
messages, one-time pads will do just fine.  And from a theoretical point of
view Tom is certainly correct.  But I think he (like many academic crypto-
graphy types) underestimates the practical problems of key security for large
volumes of routine transmissions.

   -- David desJardins