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From: tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu (Tom Tedrick)
Newsgroups: net.crypt,net.politics
Subject: Re: Who can be secure?
Message-ID: <13484@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Date: Mon, 28-Apr-86 07:54:43 EDT
Article-I.D.: ucbvax.13484
Posted: Mon Apr 28 07:54:43 1986
Date-Received: Thu, 1-May-86 03:51:02 EDT
References: <3221@reed.UUCP> <13462@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU> <13481@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU>
Sender: usenet@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU
Reply-To: tedrick@ernie.berkeley.edu.UUCP (Tom Tedrick)
Organization: University of California, Berkeley
Lines: 33
Keywords: 1 time pads, 1 time pads, 1 time pads, ...
Xref: watmath net.crypt:690 net.politics:15367
Summary: Why do I waste my time like this?

>>>  Assuming the information about breaking new Libyan codes within weeks
>>>  is correct, does that imply that the NSA is
>>>  stellar at the job it does, or that the Libyans use weak
>>>  crypto-systems?  

>>The Libyans use weak crypto-systems.

>   I disagree.  They may or may not, but this is not the point.  The reason
>we can break their codes within weeks is most likely because their key
>security is poor, not because they use a weak system.

Oh the hell with it. I give up. Go on dreaming. The NSA thanks you.

(Just for the record, I disagree, in case anyone has doubts. 
If anyone wants to believe David, be my guest.)

>>>  Is it realistically possible today for a small country or a large
>>>  company to independently secure its communications from organizations
>>>  such as NSA or the Soviet equivalent?

>>Yes.

>   Again, I disagree, with some reservations.  For small, extremely important
>messages, one-time pads will do just fine.  And from a theoretical point of
>view Tom is certainly correct. 

Correct.

>But I think he (like many academic crypto-
>graphy types) underestimates the practical problems of key security for large
>volumes of routine transmissions.
 
Incorrect.