Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 4.3bsd-beta 6/6/85; site ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Path: utzoo!decvax!bellcore!ulysses!ucbvax!dg_rama.UUCP!bruces From: bruces@dg_rama.UUCP Newsgroups: mod.ai Subject: Computer Ethics Message-ID: <8606050428.AA02925@ucbvax.Berkeley.EDU> Date: Tue, 27-May-86 13:36:39 EDT Article-I.D.: ucbvax.8606050428.AA02925 Posted: Tue May 27 13:36:39 1986 Date-Received: Thu, 5-Jun-86 09:50:01 EDT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.BERKELEY.EDU Organization: The ARPA Internet Lines: 86 Approved: ailist@sri-ai.arpa [Forwarded from the Risks Digest by Laws@SRI-AI.] The following is a copy of a review I wrote for a recent newsletter of the Boston chapter of Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR). Readers of RISKS may be interested, as well. METAPHILOSOPHY is a British journal published three times yearly which is dedicated to considerations about particular schools, fields, and methods of philosophy. The October 1985 issue, Computers & Ethics (Volume No. 16, Issue No. 4), is recommended reading [...]. This issue's articles attempt to define and delimit the scope of Computer Ethics, and examine several emerging and current concerns within the field. One current concern is responsibility for computer-based errors. In his article on the subject, John W. Snapper asks: "...whether it is advisable to ...write the law so that a machine is held legally liable for harm." The author invokes Aristotle's "Nichomachean Ethics" (!) in an analysis of how computers make decisions, and what is meant by "decision" in this context. On the same subject, William Bechtel goes one step further, considering the possibility that computers could one day bear not only legal, but moral responsibility for decision-making: "When we have computer systems that ...can be embedded in an environment and adapt their responses to that environment, then it would seem that we have captured all those features of human beings that we take into account when we hold them responsible." Deborah G. Johnson discusses another concern: ownership of computer programs. In "Should Computer Programs Be Owned?," Ms. Johnson criticizes utilitarian arguments for ownership, as well as arguments based upon Locke's labor theory of property. The proper limits to extant legal protections, including copyrights, patents, and trade secrecy laws, are called into question. Other emerging concerns include the need to educate the public on the dangers and abuses of computers, and the role of computers in education. To this end, Philip A. Pecorino and Walter Maner present a proposal for a college level course in Computer Ethics, and Marvin J. Croy addresses the ethics of computer-assisted instruction. Dan Lloyd, in his provocative but highly speculative article, "Frankenstein's Children," envisions a world where cognitive simulation AI succeeds in producing machine consciousness, resulting in a possible ethical clash of the rights of artificial minds with human values. The introductory article, James H. Moor's "What is Computer Ethics," is an ambitious attempt to define Computer Ethics, and to explain its importance. According to Moor, the development and proliferation of computers can rightly be termed "revolutionary": "The revolutionary feature of computers is their logical malleability. Logical malleability assures the enormous application of computer technology." Moor goes on to assert that the Computer Revolution, like the Industrial Revolution, will transform "many of our human activities and social institutions," and will "leave us with policy and conceptual vacuums about how to use computer technology." An important danger inherent in computers is what Moor calls "the invisibility factor." In his own words: "One may be quite knowledgeable about the inputs and outputs of a computer and only dimly aware of the internal processing." These hidden internal operations can be intentionally employed for unethical purposes; what Moor calls "Invisible abuse," or can contain "Invisible programming values": value judgments of the programmer that reside, insidious and unseen, in the program. Finally, in the appendix, "Artificial Intelligence, Biology, and Intentional States," editor Terrell Ward Bynum argues against the concept that "intentional states" (i.e. belief, desire, expectation) are causally dependent upon biochemistry, and thus cannot exist within a machine. If you're at all like me, you probably find reading philosophy can be "tough going," and METAPHILOSOPHY is no exception. References to unfamiliar works, and the use of unfamiliar terms occasionally necessitated my reading passages several times before extracting any meaning from them. The topics, however, are quite relevant and their treatment is, for the most part, lively and interesting. With its well-written introductory article, diverse survey of current concerns, and fairly extensive bibliography, this issue of METAPHILOSOPHY is an excellent first source for those new to the field of Computer Ethics. [METAPHILOSOPHY, c/o Expediters of the Printed Word Ltd., 515 Madison Avenue, Suite 1217, New York, NY 10022] Bruce A. Sesnovich mcnc!rti-sel!dg_rtp!sesnovich Data General Corp. rti-sel!dg_rtp!sesnovich%mcnc@csnet-relay.arpa Westboro, MA "Problems worthy of attack prove their worth by hitting back"